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Abstract
This paper analyzes the determinants of Italian households’ participation in the debt market, considering
both demand and supply effects and using the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth. The
probability of debt is positively influenced by age (until 35 years), which essentially acts as a demand factor.
Among the economic variables, the role of income is important: it shows a positive correlation with the
probability of debt, determined by forces acting in the same direction on both sides of the market. The
uncertainty of income reduces the demand for loans, with the exception of self-employed workers, who are
nevertheless subject to very rigid evaluation by lenders. Living in very small municipalities negatively affects
loan demand, probably because of higher entry costs in the debt market. Education influences both the demand
side, through entry costs, and banks’ evaluation. Residence is a crucial parameter: beyond the negative impact
of a greater economic risk, living in regions where banks face higher enforcement costs increases the
probability that the loan demand is not accepted. The final part of the paper considers the size of desired debt,
which seems positively linked to net wealth and future income profile. The recovered share of loans in the case
of default has a positive effect on desired debt. In general, enforcement costs have increased in importance in
the recent period.
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Keywords: household debt, enforcement costs for loan contracts
                                                            
* Bank of Italy – Research Department, Milan Branch.Contents
1. Introduction..........................................................................................................................9
2. Theory and evidence about liquidity constraints and households’ debt............................10
3. Italian households’ debt: some relevant trends..................................................................14
4. The determinants of participation in the debt market........................................................16
4.1 Two types of analysis of debt market participation....................................................16
4.2 The structure of the model..........................................................................................18
4.3 The relevant variables.................................................................................................19
4.4 The dataset..................................................................................................................22
4.5 The results of the first empirical analysis on participation.........................................23
4.6 The differences between mortgages and consumer loans...........................................29
5. The probability of demanding a loan and of being liquidity constrained..........................31
5.1 The model...................................................................................................................31
5.2 The results of the second empirical estimation of participation.................................33
6. The size of Italian households’ desired debt......................................................................36
6.1 The Tobit model..........................................................................................................37
6.2 The two-stage Heckman model..................................................................................38
7. Final remarks .....................................................................................................................43
Appendix.................................................................................................................................45
Tables and Figures..................................................................................................................51
References...............................................................................................................................691.   Introduction
1
Italian households have a low level of debt. Despite the recent large increase in lending
to households by banks and other financial companies, the household sector’s financial
liabilities were equal to 30 per cent of GDP in 2000, a far lower ratio than in other
industrialised countries. A comparison with countries for which survey data are available
confirms this point: at the end of 1998, in Italy only 19 per cent of the households carried a
debt; less than 10 per cent had borrowed to buy a house, compared with 27 per cent in
Germany and more than 40 per cent in the Netherlands, in the United Kingdom and in the
United States  (Table 1).
The decision to enter the debt market may depend on both supply and demand factors.
The first aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of Italian households’ participation
in the debt market, considering both sides of the market and disentangling their effects. The
analysis is based on an evaluation of the characteristics of indebted households using
probabilistic model. This type of approach has been used in only a few studies on foreign
countries, with the aim of gauging the gap between actual and desired debt (Cox and
Jappelli, 1993, and Duca and Rosenthal, 1993, for the US;  Leece, 1995 and 2000, for the
UK); to our knowledge it has not yet been applied to Italian households. Studies of Italian
households’ low participation in the debt market have used different strategies based on
consumption attitudes (Jappelli and Pagano, 1988 and 1989; Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese,
1994). Some other inquiries have evaluated the probability of being liquidity-constrained in
Italy by a lender (Cannari and Ferri, 1997; Fabbri and Padula, 2001): we also use this type of
analysis in order to improve the distinction between supply and demand effects. Compared
with other studies on households’ debt, in this paper we use more explanatory variables in
order to capture the characteristics of the local credit markets, especially the enforcement
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costs related to the loan contract, which in Italy are very high and exhibit marked regional
variability.
The results concerning participation in the debt market are partly in line with previous
empirical evidence concerning Italy, which has stressed the importance of supply conditions
in determining the scant diffusion of debt among Italian households; in particular, the impact
of  downpayment requirements has been highlighted ( Jappelli and  Pagano, 1989;  Guiso,
Jappelli and  Terlizzese, 1994). Among the supply factors, this paper sheds light on the
significance of loan recovery costs in the event of default, which may partly explain the
regional variability of liquidity-constraints. Other points to note are that, unlike in previous
studies, age seems to act essentially on the demand side and that, among the economic
variables, income seems to be more important than net wealth.
Our second aim is to analyze the size of the participation in the debt market through a
study of the amount of debt desired by Italian households, considering only households that
have a debt and are not liquidity constrained. From an econometric point of view, this means
estimating the determinants of loan size considering a double selection mechanism. The
evidence is fairly consistent with results obtained in other countries, mainly the US and the
UK: desired debt is positively linked to net wealth and future income profile, as the theory
predicts. It is also worth noticing that the loan recovery ratio in the event of default
correlates positively with the quantity of debt demanded by households.
The paper is organised in seven sections. A brief review of the relevant theory and the
empirical evidence is carried out in Section 2 and is followed in Section 3 by an illustration
of trends in Italian households’ debt. Sections 4 and 5 report the results of the econometric
analysis regarding the determinants of Italian households’ participation in the debt market.
The study of the size of desired debt is in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2.   Theory and evidence about liquidity constraints and households’ debt
The maximization of the utility function of a household subject to an  intertemporal
budget constraint determines a demand for debt that depends on the household’s current and
future endowment, on its uncertainty about future income, on its preferences (discount rate11
and intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and on the interest rate at which the market
allows the transfer of money from the current to the future period.
In a world with perfect information and complete markets, the consumer gets the
amount of money he desires to implement his plan of consumption smoothing. The presence
of information asymmetries hinders this process and some households are liquidity
constrained, because they are unable to obtain the same amount of credit they could receive
if information were perfect and markets complete. Hence, in determining the participation of
consumers in the debt market and its size, supply factors also play a role, with the bank
evaluating the probability of default on the loan and the amount it can recover in this event.
Empirical analysis has considered the existence of liquidity constraints with respect to
the hypothesis of permanent income in a capital market with perfect information, using both
aggregate and individual households’ data. A possible way to implement this analysis
consists in estimating a consumption function, to check whether consumption expenditure
depends not only on permanent income but also on other variables, especially current
income, a result that would suggest the existence of some type of liquidity constraint.
Another way of carrying out the analysis is based on the first-order condition of the
optimization problem (Euler condition) and has often been preferred because it does not
require a closed form solution for consumption, which is not always available (Hayashi,
1985b). In both cases, the usual assumption is that consumers form their expectations in a
rational way.  
From the first-order condition of the intertemporal choice problem, it is has been found
that the marginal rate of substitution between current and future consumption, i.e. the ratio
between marginal utility of consumption at time t  and  1 + t , is equal to the marginal rate of
transformation which characterizes the capital market ( r + 1 ):
(1) ) 1 ( )] ( [ * / ) ( 1
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The approach based on the  Euler condition essentially implies checking that no
information available at time t  should be significant in explaining consumption flow. 
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The analyses on aggregate data have generally led to the conclusion that the permanent
income hypothesis is not completely verified. The evidence is for an excess sensitivity of
consumption to current income, even after considering its information content about changes
in permanent income (Sargent, 1978; Flavin, 1981; Jappelli and Pagano, 1989; Hall, 1978,
for contrary evidence). However, it was not clear if this result was determined by the
existence of credit market imperfections or, on the other hand, either by data aggregation
problems or by myopia of the consumers, who would not have rational expectations
(Hayashi, 1985b).
Studies based on households’ data allow the hypothesis of imperfections in capital
markets to be tested with greater precision, because they avoid the aggregation problem and
permit the liquidity constrained households to be singled out, directly or indirectly. Using
these data, tests based on the  Euler condition have often confirmed previous empirical
evidence about the existence of liquidity constraints (Hall and Mishkin, 1982; Zeldes, 1989).
On the other hand, tests based on consumption growth cannot be used with cross-
section data. As an alternative, Hayashi (1985a) has suggested a reduced form approach to
model desired consumption by a household that maximises its utility function subject to
liquidity constraints in all future periods, but not in the current one. This approach uses the
coefficients of the consumption function, estimated for households which are assumed not to
be liquidity constrained, to evaluate the gap between desired and actual consumption for
those households which, on the contrary, are potentially rationed in the credit market. This
type of analysis also suggests that credit market imperfections are likely to be widespread
(Hayashi, 1985a; Jappelli and Pagano, 1988; Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese, 1994).
                                                            
2 However, Attanasio (1999) specifies that it is not obvious that one should interpret a failure of the Euler
condition as evidence of the empirical failure of the permanent income model without considering explicitly
the possibility of important demographic effects and that consumption and leisure are not separable. Hence,
such tests could be a poor tool to identify the presence of borrowing restrictions, which could be better captured
using direct questions in surveys.13
Although other papers based on households data have reached different conclusions,
3
the existence of liquidity constraints in the credit market, more widespread in some
countries, is generally accepted.
4 The consequences of liquidity constraints vary across
different categories of households. Along with the excess sensitivity analysis on
consumption, a parallel and very promising line of research has focused on the
characteristics of the households that are more likely to be rationed (for the United States
Jappelli, 1990), overcoming the limits of tests based on Euler condition and stressing above
all the microeconomic effects of the existence of credit market imperfections. The influence
of households’ social and economic characteristics on the probability of their being rationed
is also the focus of some studies concerning Italian data (Cannari and Ferri, 1997, and Fabbri
and Padula, 2001
5).
In the context of this last field of research, a more limited number of studies have
focused on the characteristics of the households that have a debt with a bank, taking into
account the existence of liquidity constraint and evaluating the gap between desired and
actual debt for constrained households (Cox and Jappelli, 1993; Duca and Rosenthal, 1993;
Leece, 1995, 2000). Moreover, their results were not always clear-cut. Generally, age seems
to be a relevant factor, with the probability of debt rising with the age of the household head
until it reaches a maximum. A greater discontinuity of evidence emerges for economic
variables; however, in most of the cases the probability of debt appears to be weakly
                                                            
3 Runkle (1991) finds strong evidence in favour of the permanent income hypothesis, while the evidence by
Shea (1995) is inconsistent with the permanent income hypothesis, with rationing in credit market and also
with an assumption of consumers’ myopic behavior.
4 The share of liquidity constrained households is estimated to be nearly 15-20 per cent in studies referring
to the United States (see Jappelli, 1990). However, some households that describe themselves as liquidity
constrained in the surveys may not actually be; their loan applications may have been turned down on the
grounds of risk. In Italy, the share of households reporting they are liquidity constrained, in the Bank of Italy’s
biennial Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), is far lower and is near 4 per cent; however the
question about the rationing process refers only to the year of the interview, while in the Survey of Consumer
Finance for the United States the household is asked whether in recent years it has been subject to liquidity
constraints.
5 Cannari and Ferri (1997) find that the probability of rationing is higher for households that are younger or
live in the South, while it is lower when income rises, if the household owns its house and lives in an area
where the bank concentration is higher and when the length of the relationship between bank and the customer
is longer, a result to which the authors gave strong emphasis. Fabbri and Padula (2001) stress in particular the
negative relationship between the probability of being constrained and the efficiency of the administration of
justice.14
correlated with current income and net wealth but linked with a measure of permanent
income. Still more fragmented are the results for other variables.
6
An analysis of the probability of debt has not yet been applied to Italy. We use this
approach because we want to evaluate the decisional process of contracting a loan, trying to
single out demand and supply factors despite some identification problems. In order to
overcome these problems, in a subsequent step of the analysis we try to study separately the
probability of applying for a loan and the probability of rationing; as said, the analysis of
rationing has already been carried out on Italian data. We think that merging the results
obtained with these two steps of the analysis on the debt market participation is particularly
interesting.
Finally, our investigation concludes with a consideration of the determinants of the
size of debt desired by Italian households, in order to evaluate the wide dispersion in loan
amounts that the following descriptive analysis highlights.
3.   Italian households’ debt: some relevant trends
In Italy, bank lending to households has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of
the 1990s. Using the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), it is
                                                            
6 Most of these analyses consider a probit model for participation in the debt market to calculate the term of
correction for non-random sample selection in a following equation for desired size of debt and generally they
work with a cross-section. As far as the influence of current income is concerned, in Cox and Jappelli (1993)
the effect on the probability of debt is positive, but marginally significant; however, the coefficient of
permanent income is strongly significant and positive. In Leece (1995, 2000) income is not significant; in King
and Leape (1998), who estimate the probability of having different types of financial assets and two types of
liabilities, without taking into account the existence of liquidity constraints, income is significant and positive
only for mortgages; in Duca and Rosentahl (1993), who restrict the sample to households under age 35, income
is not significant in a bivariate probit model which estimates the probability of debt and of being liquidity
constrained.
As for net wealth, in Cox and Jappelli (1993), after being instrumented this variable has a negative on the
probability of debt and is not significant; in Leece (1995), total expenditure, used as a proxy for wealth, after
being instrumented has a positive sign and is significant; in King and Leape (1998), the relationship between
the probability of debt and net wealth is concave and positive; in Duca and Rosenthal (1993) instrumented net
wealth is not significant.
Education is not always considered and is significant only in King and Leape (1998) for mortgages, while it
does not matter in Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Duca and Rosenthal (1993). As for indicators of income
uncertainty, different proxies are used but no clear pattern emerges. Indicators of bank supply are never used.15
possible to carry out a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of households that have been
granted a loan in the past years and to focus on some recent changes. From this descriptive
analysis we also obtain some clues on the variables to consider in the following econometric
investigation.
The SHIW, which is carried out every two years, contains detailed information on
income, wealth composition and social, demographic and economic characteristics of a
sample of approximately 8,000 households (see the Appendix for details)
7.
In the most recent surveys, the share of households with a loan for personal purposes is
close to 20 per cent. House purchase or renovation is the main reason households apply for
loans, followed by the need to finance the purchase of a car or other vehicles (Table 2).
Table 3 shows that the percentage of households with debt increases with the age of
the head, until a maximum in the class between 31-40 years. Moreover, participation in the
credit market is positively correlated with household net wealth and, above all, with income.
As far as social and demographic features are concerned, the level of education has a
positive effect on the probability of debt, up to the high school diploma. Households living
in a municipality with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants or in southern regions are less likely to
carry debts. The distribution of the average amount of the loan, according to social and
economic characteristics and only for those households with a positive debt, gives a picture
which is quite similar to that of participation in the loan market: in classes where the
frequency of debt is higher, the amount of the loan is on average larger (Table 4). 
8
From the SHIW it is also possible to outline some recent trends. Italian households’
participation in the debt market strongly increased at the beginning of the 1990s, both for
mortgages and consumer loans, then stabilized and finally showed a decrease in 1998 as a
result of two opposite trends: a rise in consumer credit, essentially for the purchase of
vehicles, and a fall in mortgages (Table 2).
                                                            
7 For a comparison between the SHIW, national accounts and financial accounts, see Brandolini and
Cannari (1994) and Brandolini (1999).
8 This is not true for self-employed workers, who show a noticeably larger average amount of debt than
employees, despite the latter’s higher frequency of debt, especially in the earlier surveys.16
These trends are quite consistent with the indications provided by Bank Supervisory
Reports on bank lending to consumer households, which increased substantially at the
beginning of the 1990s and then stabilised around the middle of the decade. On the contrary,
the recent reduction in the mortgage participation rate is inconsistent with the evidence from
Bank Supervisory Reports, which highlights an acceleration in the households’ loans at the
end of the 1990s. However, this reduction can be better understood if this piece of
information is read together with the increase in the average mortgage amount (only for
households with debt) recorded between the 1995 and 1998 (19,191 to 22,660 euros; Table
5). Another partial explanation lies in the fact that the SHIW tends to underweight the class
of the self-employed workers (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994), who in recent years have
strongly increased their demand for loans, as we will see in Section 5. More precisely, in
Table 5 one may further observe that the recent increase in the average amount of mortgages
has mainly concerned households whose head is self-employed, has a high-school diploma, a
high income (above the median) and living in the North (especially in the North-East). The
increase is also marked for those holding financial assets and, particularly, with medium and
high-risk financial portfolios.
4.   The determinants of participation in the debt market
4.1   Two types of analysis of debt market participation
To disentangle the impact of different factors influencing the probability of debt and
overcome the limits of the previous  univariate descriptive analysis, two directions are
followed in the econometric investigation.
First, the probability of having a loan is analyzed using a question of the SHIW in
which households are asked whether, at the end of the year preceding the interview, they had
a debt with banks or other financial companies for personal purposes. If the household has a
loan for one out of the five different categories in the question (Table 2 and Appendix), the
event occurs. The five categories of debt are then aggregated in the two classes of mortgages
and consumer loans, for an analysis aimed at distinguishing between these two types of
household financing.17
An important drawback of this type of analysis derives from the fact that if we observe
a household with zero debt we cannot be sure that this is the exclusive outcome of the
demand process, as it could also reflect rejected loan applications. In other words, we face an
identification  problem, which we try to overcome by imposing restrictions on some
variables, included only in the supply schedule and not in the demand function or viceversa.
Nevertheless, there remain some factors acting on both sides of the market, i.e. income, net
wealth, education and residence area. However, we decide to use this question of the SHIW
because it has been asked continuously during various years, allowing us to work with a
more informative dataset; moreover, it also makes it possible to single out the determinants
of the two main categories of debt, mortgages and consumer loans.
To better tackle the identification problem, we then try another direction, based on a
different group of questions, allowing us to single out those households that asked for a loan
in the year, those whose applications had been totally or partially rejected, and those that did
not apply for a loan, because they expected to receive a negative answer (see the Appendix
for further details). In this second exercise we are therefore able to study the probability of
demanding a loan  separately from the probability of being rationed, conditional on
application for a loan. This second analysis has the advantage of overcoming to a large
extent the above-mentioned identification problems, as we can separately observe the
determinants of loan demand and the variables affecting the bank’s evaluation process; the
shortcomings are that it cannot be carried out on a continuous basis (only for the 1989, 1995
and 1998 surveys
9), it cannot distinguish between the different categories of loans and it
does not offer any information about the size of the loan.
This section contains the results of the first empirical estimation. The evidence
referring to the second type of the participation analysis is discussed in Section 5.
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4.2   The structure of the model
The demand for a loan by a household 
* D , which derives from the difference between
desired consumption and actual endowment, depends on different economic, social and
geographical factors and on the entry costs in the debt market.
Thus, let
 (2)  e a + = 1
' * X D
where  X1  denotes the set of observable variables determining the household’s demand for a
loan and  e  is a stochastic error capturing unobservable factors, normally distributed with
mean 0 and variance 
2
e s .
The outcome of the demand for a loan, 
* A , hinges on the evaluation by the lender,
which is based on a group of determinants,  X 2 , which may overlap with  X1 (in particular,
income, net wealth, education and residence) and also contain other factors, such as
customer credit history and the costs of operating in a particular area, which should be
mainly relevant in the supply schedule. Then let
(3)  m g + = 2
' * X A  
where m  is a stochastic error, normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 
2
m s .
We are able to observe only the final outcome of these two decision-making processes
and therefore only whether the household has a debt (D=1) or not (D=0). The possible cases
that may occur are:
(4) D = 1   if 
* D > 0 and  0
* > A
10  or
(5)     D = 0   if 
* D >0  and  0
* = A     or
                                                            
10 If A*<D* the household is only partially constrained, but it does have debt and belongs to the group of
households for which the event occurs; this group accounts for 49.7 per cent of the liquidity constrained
households and for 2.2 per cent of the households with debt (weighted frequencies calculated on all the five
surveys of the SHIW). If A* >D* the household is not constrained.19
(6)  D = 0   if 
* D = 0 
  Under (5) the consumer is totally liquidity constrained, while under (6) he has a
desired debt equal to zero.
As already mentioned, when using the first group of questions we are not able to
separately identify demand and supply effects. Therefore, we estimate the following
probability model for the event of holding a loan:
(7)    P D X ( ) ( ' ) = = 1 F b   
where D=1 if the household has a debt with a lender, F is the distribution function of the
standardized normal and C stands for debt determinants which include demand factors and
the entry costs ( X1) and also supply-side aspects (X 2 ). A vector of coefficients b , which is
a combination of the two vectors a  e g  not separately determinable, is estimated. A variable
can be exclusively considered either a demand or a supply factor only if the effects coming
from the two sides of the market act in the opposite direction.
4.3   The relevant variables
As to demand factors, theory suggests different explanatory variables. Age is one of
the most important and there is a fairly wide consensus about its sign, both on theoretical and
empirical grounds. Young households, with expectations of growing income and a high
marginal utility of consumption, due both to the likely modest level of current income and to
the needs connected with creating a new family, should express a high demand for debt,
which is likely to decrease beyond a certain age threshold. In order to capture some non-
linearities in the relationship, age enters the model both in a linear and a quadratic term.
A second important factor is net wealth as an indicator of households’ current and
future endowment. The sign of net wealth is not easy to define a priori. When the
endowment grows, households can autonomously finance a greater share of desired
consumption and the probability of debt should fall, at a rate that is higher the more liquid is
their wealth. However, at intermediate levels of wealth, an increase in the endowment could
also translate into a noticeable rise in consumption needs and hence in the frequency of debt.
Moreover, for these latter households it may be easier to satisfy the downpayment conditions20
required by lenders. In empirical works, as mentioned earlier, one can find heterogeneity of
results (see footnote 6).
As regards income, what matters is the steepness of the expected income profile: in the
case of flat expected income there is no need to anticipate financial resources through debt.
Therefore, the probability of a loan should be positively correlated with the expectation of a
sharp increase in earning capacity, which we try to capture with an education dummy. Other
variables are used to gauge the degree of uncertainty of future income.
As regards the relationship with current income, there exists uncertainty about its sign,
as in the case of net wealth. Theory suggests that when current income increases, the
probability of debt should diminish. However, at low and intermediate levels of income, for
different reasons the probability of debt may also increase when income rises. First, at low
levels of income the marginal utility of consumption is very high and an increase in earnings
may translate into a rise in expenditure and hence into a greater demand for loans. Secondly,
very low levels of income are normally associated with greater income variability, which
tends to reduce the probability of debt. Finally, an increase in income, especially near the
median of the income distribution, raises the probability that the household may more easily
satisfy downpayment conditions. Thus, the sign of the overall income effect is ambiguous
like the empirical evidence (footnote 6). We try to capture these aspects by inserting a
second-order polynomial in income.
Another factor affecting the decision to apply for a loan is the  risk level in the
residence area, captured with a dummy: in the South, where the unemployment rate is
sharply higher and the level of background risk stronger, the consumer might be less inclined
to ask for a loan. The  risk attitude in the composition of financial portfolio is also
considered, following the evidence emerging from the descriptive analysis, which highlights
a recent positive correlation between this variable and the frequency of debt.
Education, beyond reflecting the potential expansion of income, is likely also to
capture aspects linked to the entry costs in the debt market. Households with a high school
diploma are likely to bear lower entry costs, since they face fewer difficulties in collecting
and evaluating the information needed for the decision to contract a loan. The entry costs can
also be affected by other variables, such as residence in a very small municipality with21
poorly diversified bank supply. We use a dummy that takes a value of one when the
household lives in a municipality with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants.
*    *   *
The evaluation by the bank is based on the probability of customer’s default and on the
amount the bank may recover in this case. Therefore, it depends on the household’s social
and economic characteristics, such as the age of the head, net wealth, current and expected
income, education and the residence area. As both sides of the market are influenced by
these variables, the interpretation of their coefficients is tricky.
We can argue that the probability that a loan application will be approved increases
with age, consequently opposing the force of the relationship emerging on the demand side,
where the need for a loan is strongest for the youngest classes. Moreover, the probability of
liquidity constraints should be negatively correlated with income and net wealth: such an
effect might either reduce the power of the relationship arising on the demand side or, on the
contrary, reinforce it, in the event that the correlation between income/net wealth and the
probability of demanding a loan is positive.
Finally, the probability of approval should increase with education and be lower in
regions with a greater economic risk: therefore, the impact of these two factors on the supply
side is added to that on the demand side, blurring and making it hard to separate the two
effects.
Other factors that may affect the decision of lenders are those concerning the customer
relationship. 
11 Where this relationship is stronger and more lasting, it might be easier for the
bank to evaluate the customer’s reliability and hence it is more likely that the loan contract is
signed (Petersen and  Rajan, 1994).  According to  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), banks may
rationally avoid finding an equilibrium on the credit market through the interest rate, since
an increase in the interest rate might attract the riskiest customers ( adverse selection) or
induce firms to implement the most difficult projects with the greatest return variability
                                                            
11 The evaluation by lenders also depends on the customer’s credit history, but on this issue there is no
information in the SHIW.22
(moral hazard). In this case, the choice of rationing may be optimal for banks. For
households, likewise, a greater amount of information for the bank, through a longer
relationship with the customer, could reduce uncertainty and hence lead to a greater
probability of debt. We try to capture these aspects using a  Herfindahl index, on the
assumption that higher bank supply concentration allows better knowledge of the customer;
for a shorter period (1993-1998) the length of the relationship between customer and bank is
also used as an indicator of its intensity.
In order to give a better representation of the factors considered by the bank in its
evaluation process, two other variables are taken into account to gauge the  enforcement
costs: loans’ average regional recovery time and share. The variability of these costs across
Italian regions is very substantial (Table 6). Considering loan recovery time, it is worth
noting that southern regions rank far below those of the North. However, the picture is quite
different for loan recovery share, as some southern regions rank high, while the situation of
the North is very diversified. As a general statement, the probability of debt should be
stronger in regions where the recovery share is higher and/or the recovery time is shorter.
Finally, the interest rate that banks apply to consumer households on a provincial basis
is considered as a proxy of the rate of return to which the market allows resource transfers
between different periods. Moreover, in all the regressions time dummies are also included,
to take into account possible shocks concerning the whole economy or improvements in the
credit market.
4.4   The dataset
Households’ socio-economic characteristics are drawn from the Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (SHIW). The surveys considered cover the years 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995
and 1998. The nominal variables are expressed in real terms using the consumer price index,
whose base year is 1995. The decision to start from 1989 is based on the consideration that
the questions in the 1987 survey were markedly different from those in the following years;
moreover, affluent households were oversampled in 1987.23
We use households’ residence and merge social and economic data with information
drawn from other sources. Data on bank supply are from Bank Supervisory Reports.
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Interest rates, from the Central Credit Register, are short-term rates on loans granted by
banks to households. Data on the enforcement costs are taken from a questionnaire sent by
the Bank of Italy to a representative sample of banks for the years 1992-1993 and hence this
information does not show time variability (see Appendix for more information).
In order to avoid outliers influencing the estimation’s results, households belonging to
the 1
st and to the 99th percentiles of income and net wealth are dropped from the following
econometric analysis; households with missing values on the dependent variable and whose
head is younger than 20 or older than 70 are also excluded, because they are presumably not
involved in the decision-making process under examination.
4.5   The results of the first empirical analysis on participation
This subsection is mainly based on the results obtained with the panel estimation of the
probability model of interest, which is the preferred specification and generalizes the special
case of the pooled regression of all the observations under the hypothesis of independent
errors. Using the panel component of the SHIW allows us to shape in a more precise way the
differences in the households’ behaviour, but greatly reduces the number of observations:
the panel is built considering all the households that are in the SHIW at least twice in the
period under analysis (see the Appendix for further details); observations where a change of
the head occurred are deleted. The regression on the panel component therefore uses 13,793
observations, while in the pooled regression 32,588 observations are considered. To offset
the effects of this large reduction, the results based on the pooled specification are
sometimes referred to as a term of comparison.
We estimate a probit panel model with random effects, where the error term becomes:
                                                            
12 For special credit institution a different source of data was used for the years before 1995, when special
credit institutions reported loans not disaggregated by geographical area. The split of the data by provinces was
carried out using the shares calculated in the first year when special credit institutions reported to Bank
Supervisory Reports and transposing them for previous years.24
(8) eit it i v u = +
where i is the i-th household, t  is the year,  vit  denotes the usual random error and  i u  is a
household-specific stochastic disturbance, constant over time, with zero mean and variance
s u
2. The hypothesis is that the two errors are independent and therefore:
(9)  Var[eit]=1+ s u
2
(10)    Corr[e e it is , ]= s s
2 2 1 u u / + =r
In such a case, the errors referring to the same household  ) (i  and two distinct periods
) , ( s t  are not independent, as is assumed in the less general case of a pooled regression.
A Likelihood Ratio test rejects the hypothesis that the correlation between the errors
in two different periods is equal to zero (Table 7, the test that panel level variance is equal to
zero). The variance component introduced by the difference of each household with respect
to the others is therefore significant. Thus, errors are not independent and, as said, the panel
specification is the preferred one.
*    *   *
As expected on the basis of the theory and in line with previous empirical evidence,
the probability of debt increases with age (Table 7) and reaches a maximum for people aged
35 (Figure 1). The marginal effect of ageing from 20 to 35 years on the estimated probability
of debt is equal to 7 percentage points (from 0.17 to 0.24), while over the following 20 years
the probability decreases by 11 percentage points (0.13 for people aged 55).
  13 It seems that
demand is the main channel for the age effect, with people asking for loans when young,
rather than supply, with banks favouring later entrance in debt market.
As far as  net wealth  is concerned, in the pooled  regression it shows a positive
relationship with the probability of debt, but this relationship fades off in the panel
estimation, where net wealth is no longer significant (Table 7). Moreover, net wealth may
                                                            
13
 The marginal effects of each variable are calculated at the mean value of the other regressors.25
suffer from simultaneity problems, which are particularly evident for consumer credit. In the
consumer credit case, after an increase in debt probability caused by unobservable factors, a
reduction in net wealth may follow, creating a correlation between errors and explanatory
variables that causes inconsistency of the estimator. This is not necessarily true in the case of
mortgages, because an increase in debt is normally followed by a rise in real assets, so that
there is no substantial effect on net wealth. To tackle the simultaneity problem, we use the
lag of net wealth that is not significant as well. Since lagging net wealth cannot be enough to
avoid endogeneity, we run a panel regression with random effects excluding net wealth. The
main results hold (Table 7). It is therefore possible to argue that both in the decision to ask
for a loan and in the evaluation by the bank there are more important variables than the
household’s net wealth. This result will be confirmed in the next empirical estimation,
reported in Section 5.
Another point to stress is that the probability of debt increases with disposable income
(Table 7), although this relationship weakens for higher incomes and changes sign after a
value of income equal to 46,000 euros (between 90 and 95 percentile of the distribution;
Figure 2). Moreover, the marginal effect of income is rather important: moving from the first
to the third quartile of the distribution (15,000 to 31,000 euros) raises the probability of debt
by more than 4 percentage points. The greater importance of income with respect to net
wealth is an interesting result, because it distinguishes Italy from other countries, where the
probability of debt appears to be weakly correlated with current income.
The analysis concerning income is further carried out separately for the two types of
debt, mortgages and consumer loans (see the subsection 4.6). The evidence is that income
has a positive and significant effect on the probability of a mortgage only in the central part
of the distribution (40th-80th percentiles), while the influence on the probability of a
consumer loan is important for a wider part of the income distribution. It is therefore
possible to argue that when income is at low-medium levels, the relationship between the
probability of debt and income is positive, essentially because the high marginal utility of
consumption translates all the income upswing into expenditure rises, which are frequently
financed by debt. In the subsequent part of the income distribution (near the median and
beyond), the greater possibility of satisfying the mortgage downpayment conditions could
also help to explain the positive relationship between current income and the probability of26
debt. On the other hand, this result could also be linked to supply-side factors: when income
increases, the probability of rationing should decrease, as is confirmed in the analysis carried
out in Section 5.
The variables measuring the  uncertainty of income are significant and have the
expected signs. Self-employed workers (Table 7), whose income is subject to greater
variability, and employees that work in small firms (fewer than 20 employees; Table 8) have
a lower probability of contracting a loan; the marginal effect is respectively 3.0 and 3.4
percentage points (around one fifth of the estimated probability). The number of income-
earners in the household and the expectation of retirement income, which on the contrary
should bring greater certainty in the calculation of permanent income, are significant, have
the expected positive sign and a marginal effect that is equal to 2.0 percentage points for
each additional income-earner and 3.0 points for the dummy that captures the existence of a
retirement income (Table 7; 14.0 and 21.6 per cent of the estimated probability). For such
variables it is possible to assume that demand and supply effects move in the same direction;
more precise indications are drawn from the subsequent analysis. Comparison with foreign
studies is not easy, as different variables are used, but in general no clear pattern emerges.
Obtaining a high school diploma increases the probability of debt, with a marginal
effect of 2.4 percentage points (Table 7; 17.4 of the estimated probability). This relationship
may either reflect the expectation of higher future income or the ability to process the
information, which reduces the entry costs in the debt market. In the first case, education
should have greater importance for young people. However, once interacted with age
classes, the education dummy is significant only for people between ages 40 and 65 (Table
9), a result that lets us suppose that the second aspect might be prevailing. According to the
interpretation offered by King and Leape (1998), information flows with age, and as people
age the ability to process this flow of information becomes more important.
14 Reinforcing
this hypothesis, an index of knowledge of financial assets (see the Appendix) is highly
significant in determining the probability of debt (Table 8): moving from the first to the third
                                                            
14King and Leape (1998) refer to information on the investment opportunities for an optimal financial
portfolio, but a similar argument might well also hold for information concerning households’ financial
liabilities.27
quartile of its distribution, the estimated probability of debt increases by 4 percentage points
(one fifth of the estimated probability). From this evidence, education appears mainly as a
demand factor, given that for the supply side it should have greater weight as an indicator of
future income and hence when the head of the household is younger. Generally, education
does not matter in previous empirical works, but a measure of permanent income is highly
significant in Cox and Jappelli (1993).
In this estimation, it is also clear that in very small towns households are less
indebted: the entry difficulties in debt market, mainly due to limited choice of banks, and the
more pervasive presence of informal credit markets, decrease the probability of debt by 3.7
percentage points (26.2 of the estimated probability; Table 7).
In the areas characterized by  economic fragility, with high unemployment, the
probability of debt should be lower. However, the dummy South, which should reflect this
aspect, is not significant; what we can notice is that the probability of debt is far higher for
people living in the central part of Italy (Table 7), where, as we will see in the next section,
loan demand is stronger. Therefore, the aspects linked to the economic risk do not allow us
to capture all the geographical variability characterizing households’ participation in the debt
market.
As far as the enforcement costs are concerned, the probability of debt is positively
influenced by a higher share of recovered loan (Table 7) and this effect is important from an
economic point of view: the estimated probability of debt increases by more than 8
percentage points moving from the minimum (41) to the maximum (84.5) recovered share of
a loan (Figure 3). By contrasts, the length of recovery time does not seem to be important,
although it has the expected negative sign.
Finally, the other variables related to the  bank supply show a situation where an
excessive supply fragmentation does not seem to favour the probability of debt, which
increases with bank concentration, as measured by a Herfindahl index (Table 7). However,
this effect is not very strong: moving from the first to the third quartile of the Herfindahl
index increases the probability of debt by a little more than 1 percentage point. The length of
the bank relationship, a variable available from the SHIW only for the 1993-98 period, has a
positive and significant effect: a relationship lasting between 5 and 10 years increases the28
probability of debt by 4.1 percentage points (around a quarter of the estimated probability;
Table 8). Previous studies did not consider supply variables in the estimation of the
probability of debt.
Lastly, the interest rate’s coefficient has the expected negative sign, as in other
studies considering this variable (Leece, 1995 and 2000), but it is only marginally significant
(Table 7). The scant importance of the interest rate might stem from the fact that its
determinants are already considered in the regression: a measure of the customer risk is
captured through other variables, while bank’s market power can be gauged by the index of
supply concentration.
*    *   *
As a check of robustness of the results, we consider the fact that in the SHIW sampling
occurs in two stages, first at the municipal level and then at the household level; therefore,
neighbourhood effects might induce a correlation among observations, affecting standard
errors. We take into account the possibility that observations are independent among
different municipalities in the SHIW (almost 300 in each survey), but there could be
dependence among the observations in a municipality. Correcting standard errors for
clustering on municipality, the interpretation of the results does not change (we do not report
these results referring to a pooled specification).
Moreover, taking into account the rather high correlation between dummies capturing
the expectation of a retirement income and the number of children, which are correlated with
the age of the head (the correlation is near 0.5), a regression excluding these variables is run:
we do not observe any important change in the coefficients of the other explanatory variables
(the results are note reported).
The last check of robustness of the results is based on an analysis over the two
subperiods, 1989-93 and 1995-98 (Table 9). The most important differences concern the
variables related to the households’ residence: the recovered share of loans is significant in
both periods, but it has a far stronger marginal effect in the most recent one; the dummy
South is never significant, but it has a negative sign for 1995-98. It is therefore possible to
argue that in recent years, even in a context of a growth trend in lending to households, the
degree of credit rationing across areas, essentially caused by growing difficulties in29
recovering loans in the event of default, has been increasing. Another clear difference arising
in the most recent period is that the self-employment dummy is no longer significant,
suggesting that credit rationing towards such workers has weakened and/or that their demand
for loans has greatly increased.
4.6   The differences between mortgages and consumer loans
In order to verify whether the decision-making process for mortgages has different
determinants than that for consumer loans, we consider separately the two types of decisions.
From the estimation of a bivariate probit model pooling all the observations, these decisions
appear to be linked and an estimation taking into account the correlations between errors is
therefore more efficient (Table 10).
The specification for the bivariate probit model is the following. Let 
* MD  and 
* CD
denote respectively the desired demand for mortgages and consumer loans and 
* MA
and
* CA  the corresponding outcomes after lenders’ evaluation process:
(11) 1 1 1
* ' e b + = X MD      1 2 1
* ' m g + = X MA
(12) 2 1 2
* ' e b + = X CD      2 2 2
* ' m g + = X CA     
The assumptions about the stochastic errors are:
(13)  E[e1]=E[e2]=E[ 1 m ]=E[ 2 m ]=0
(14) Var[e1]=Var[e2]=Var[ 1 m ]=Var[ 2 m ]=1
(15)  Cov[e e 1 2 , ]=r
with  r measuring the correlation between the unobservable factors [e e 1 2 , ] affecting the
households’ decisions. We are able to observe only the binary variables y1 and  y2:
(16)  y1 1 =  if  0
* > MD  and  0 >
* MA     y1 0 =  otherwise
(17)   y2 1 =  if  0
* > CD  and   0 >
* CA     y2 0 =  otherwise30
reflecting the underlying decisional processes, with  1 1 = y  ( 1 2 = y ) denoting the event of a
positive demand for a mortgage (consumer loan) that has been met by lenders. The main
hypothesis made here is that the factors affecting the two decision processes are supposed to
be the same and represented on the demand side by  1 X  and on the supply side by 2 X .
A  Wald test reveals that the coefficients of the same  regressors are significantly
different in these two equations (Table 10, the last test). With regard to age, the probability
of a mortgage reaches a maximum for people near 37, while for consumer loans the highest
frequency comes earlier, around age 29. This evidence may be connected with the fact that
people ask for consumer loans when younger, for example they buy a car before a house;
moreover, as we will see, banks are more likely to grant consumer loans than mortgages to
riskier borrowers, like the youngest are. As far as income is concerned, the marginal effect is
more important for consumer debt: moving from the first to the third quartile of the income
distribution, the estimated probability of a consumer loan increases by nearly 3.5 percentage
points (more than one third of the estimated probability), while the effect on the probability
of a mortgage is around 2 percentage points. The impact of earnings on the probability of a
mortgage is significant only in the central part of the income distribution, while the effect on
consumer loans is significant in almost all the distribution (Table 10).
With regard to net wealth, which did not appear to be a main explanatory variable, we
find the most substantial differences: for mortgages the relationship is positive, while for
consumer loans it is negative (Table 10). Moreover, this result holds up in the estimation of
two independent panel models (the results are not reported), while for the general case net
wealth was not significant in the panel estimation (Table 7). Finally, using the lag of net
wealth to avoid simultaneity problems, we find that this variable still matters only for
mortgages, but is no longer significant for consumer loans (the results are not reported).
Generally, the probability for consumer loans also seems less influenced by
uncertainty of income: the self-employed dummy is not significant and the dummy South has
a positive sign and is significant at a confidence level of 10 per cent (Table 10). The
coefficient of the interest rate is negative and significant for mortgages, while it turns31
positive, but losing its significance for consumer loans, probably owing to a sort of
substitution effect.
15 In conclusion, households which are granted a consumer loan seem
potentially riskier than the ones with mortgages, for which the screening by lenders appear to
be more careful: however, the risk of a loan also hinges on its size and length and it might
therefore be easier for risky households to obtain a consumer loan, given that the amount
granted is generally lower and the maturity shorter.
It is worth also considering that  education is a significant variable only for
mortgages.
16 A possible explanation may lie in the fact that today a consumer loan is
considered as an additional element of a consumer-durable purchase and the only entry cost
for the consumer consists in evaluating if the interest rate is appropriate. On the other hand,
this result could also be explained by the fact that a bank granting a mortgage attributes
greater importance to education, which is a proxy for the slope of income profile and matters
only if the length of the loan is long.
Finally, in regions where the loan’s recovered share on default is larger, the probability
of debt is higher for both types of loan: enforcement costs thus seem to have similar effects.
5.   The probability of demanding a loan and of being liquidity constrained
5.1   The model
In this section we carry out a second analysis of participation in the debt market to
sharpen the distinction between supply and demand factors.
First we estimate the probability of a household  demanding  a loan, using as
explanatory variables the ones of the baseline specification in Table 7, in order to single out
those factors acting on the demand schedule. The latent demand function is:
                                                            
15 The interest rate used is that demanded by banks essentially on mortgages: possibly, when this rate
increases, people may be induced to ask for more consumer loans.
16
 Also in King and Leape (1998), who estimate a model of the allocation of portfolio among different
financial assets and two liabilities, education is significant only for mortgages and not for consumer credit.32
(18) D X
* ' = + a e 1  
and the binary variables that we observe are:
(19)  D = 1 if  0
* > D   or otherwise
(20) 0 = D if  0
* = D
In order to evaluate separately the supply side of the market, we also estimate a credit
rationing equation by the bank, only for households that asked for a loan (probability of
rationing conditional on the loan demand), where we use as explanatory variables the factors
that a bank considers as relevant in the decision to grant a loan: we exclude from the
estimation only the variables related to customer’ attitude towards risk on financial
investments and the interest rate. The main purpose of this exercise is to evaluate the relative
weights of the factors acting in the supply schedule.
The bank’s latent evaluation function is:
(21) m g + = 2
' *
X A  
where 
* A  denotes the maximum value of the loan that the bank agrees to grant to the
customer. The binary variables observed are:
(22) 1 = RAZ if  0
* > D  and  0
* = A otherwise
(23) 1 = RAZ if  0
* > D  and 
* * D A < otherwise
(24) 0 = RAZ if  0
* > D  and 
* * D A >
Under 22 and 23 credit rationing is either total or partial; households that belong to
case 24 are not liquidity constrained.
The period under analysis is shorter than in the previous exercise: there are 22,620
observations for the analysis of the probability of loan demand and just 1,287 for probability33
of rationing, conditional on the loan demand.
17 Because of the modest number of
observations in the latter model, estimations are based on a pooled regression, also
considering that from the estimation of a panel regression with random effects of the
probability of asking for a loan and of being liquidity constrained not conditional on the
demand, the variance component brought in by each household is not significantly different
from zero and the pooled specification is therefore the preferred one. This analysis is similar
to the one performed by Cannari and Ferri (1997) and Fabbri and Padula (2001). The results
are presented in Table 11.
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5.2   The results of the second empirical estimation of participation
The probability of demanding a loan increases with the age of the head, reaching a
maximum at 29 years and falling by one half at around 55; by contrast, this variable is not
significant in the probit estimation concerning the evaluation by the bank (Table 11). Age
confirms its role essentially on the demand side, with a fairly large marginal effect. This
result differs from those of previous analyses, where the probability of credit rationing
decreases with the age of the head (Jappelli, 1990; Cannari and Ferri, 1997; Fabbri e Padula,
2001
19).
Net wealth is weakly significant in the loan demand equation and does not seem to be a
determinant factor for the bank either. Such evidence confirms the scant importance of this
variable already noticed in our earlier empirical investigation and also in other studies
(Cannari and Ferri, 1997).
 20
                                                            
17 To avoid a further reduction in the number of observations, we do not exclude households whose head is
younger than 20 or older than 70. However, the results hold even with this exclusion.
18
 The reported results for the probability of rationing refer to a model only for those households that have
demanded a loan. In a probit estimation that takes this censoring into account (where the identification is
obtained by including the debt-market entry costs, i.e. the dummy for small municipalities, only in the probit
for the loan demand and not in the rationing equation) the results are not very different.
19
  However,  Jappelli (1990) and  Fabbri and  Padula (2001) consider only the liquidity constrained
probability non conditional on the demand for a loan. In Cannari and Ferri (1997) age is also significant only in
determining the probability of rationing non conditional on the loan application.
20
 In Jappelli (1990), the probability of credit rationing is influenced by net wealth, which is, however, less
important than disposable income. Fabbri and Padula do not use net wealth.34
Disposable income has a positive effect on the demand for loans; moving from the first
to the third quartile of income, the estimated probability increases by less than 1 percentage
point, but almost one fifth of the estimated probability. The positive relationship between
income and the probability of debt, observed in the previous empirical investigation, is also
emphasized by the negative sign in the  probit model related to the supply side. The
probability of rationing decreases when disposable income rises, with an important marginal
effect: moving from the first to the third quartile of income, the probability of rationing
decreases by nearly 6 percentage points (60 per cent of the estimated probability). This result
increases the evidence that income acts in the same direction on both sides of the market.
The importance of disposable income also emerges in Jappelli (1990) and Cannari and Ferri
(1997).
The most important finding about the uncertainty of income is that, despite the greater
volatility of their earnings, self-employed workers are more likely to ask for a loan. The self-
employed dummy has a positive sign for the probability of loan demand, but is significant
only at the 10 per cent level; its level of significance increases to 1 per cent in the period
1995-98,  confirming that self-employed households have recently contributed to the
acceleration in the demand for loans. However, self-employed workers are more frequently
subject to credit rationing: the probability of being liquidity constrained increases by 5
percentage points when the self-employment dummy is equal to 1 (more than 50 per cent of
the estimated probability). The negative sign of the probability of having a debt for this
category of households, found in the previous empirical investigation in Section 4, is
therefore essentially due to supply factors. On the other hand, the other dummies capturing
income uncertainty, the number of income earners and the expectation of retirement income,
are significant and positive only on the demand side, while they are not significant factors
for the bank. Other studies also show that the self-employed workers are more likely to be
rationed (Cannari and Ferri, 1997; Fabbri and Padula, 2001).
Italian households living in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants are less
prone to ask for loans: when the corresponding dummy is equal to one, the probability of
demanding a loan falls by a quarter, probably because of higher debt-market entry costs; this
variable is not significant in the supply schedule.35
Education, which on the basis of the previous evidence was considered a factor
potentially affecting entry costs, has the expected positive sign in the demand equation, but
is significant only at the 10 per cent level. In contrast with our previous results, the education
dummy is also important in the bank’s evaluation process: the probability of credit rationing
falls by more than half when the household head has a high school diploma. In general, the
previous evidence on this point was mixed.
 21
Households living in the central Italy are more likely to ask for a loan, while it is not
true those in the South are less likely to demand credit: the dummy South is not significantly
different from zero, essentially because there are some southern regions, especially the
Islands, with a high percentage of households demanding loans. However, households in the
South are more frequently subject to credit rationing: the probability of being liquidity
constrained increases by 12.8 percentage points when the dummy South is equal to one
(more than the estimated probability). Therefore, the economic weakness of the area where
the household lives is an important supply factor (see also Cannari and Ferri, 1997).
Moreover, after controlling for the households’ residence, the demand for loans seems
to be more widespread in regions where the loan’s recovered share in the event of default is
greater and where the recovery time is also longer; in this latter case there could be an
incentive to act in this way.
From the equation concerning rationing we obtain the important result that lenders
tighten their evaluation in regions where the recovery time is longer: moving from the first to
the third quartiles (56 and 77 months respectively), the probability of credit rationing
increases by 4 percentage points, nearly half of the estimated probability (Figure 4).
However, this result is true only if we do not consider the dummy area in the rationing
equation (Table 11, columns 2 and 3), as the ranking of regions by recovery time is matched
by the classification based on a dummy area (Table 6):  recovery time is the longest in the
South and generally falls to its lowest level in the North.
                                                            
21 Education was not significant in Jappelli (1990) and Cannari and Ferri (1997), but was significant in
Fabbri and Padula (2001).36
By contrast, the recovered share does not seem to be a relevant factor for the bank.
Among the enforcement costs, it matters in determining the probability of debt, as observed
in our previous analysis, while the probability of being constrained is correlated only with
the recovery time. A possible explanation of this evidence may be that the demand for loans
is higher in regions where the recovery time is longer and where, simultaneously, rationing is
more widespread: demand and supply effects could therefore offset each other in the
estimation of the probability of debt and recovery time is therefore not significant. On the
other hand, the positive and significant coefficient of the recovered share in the estimation of
the probability of debt could capture the fact that when the recovery rate is particularly high
(as in the North-East, Lombardy and Umbria), the demand for loans is also stronger, but
recovery time and hence credit rationing are modest. In conclusion, for our purposes the
valuable information is that when loan recovery time increases, lenders become far more
careful in selecting customers and that this form of selection coincides with a geographical
one.
Finally, the degree of bank concentration is not significant in the demand equation,
while it enters into the equation of rationing with the expected negative sign, even if it is
significant only at 10 per cent level. This result is consistent with the evidence in Cannari
and Ferri (1997).
6.   The size of Italian households’ desired debt
Italian households are characterized both by a relatively low incidence of borrowing
and by large differences in their amount of debt (Table 4). To conclude the analysis, it is
therefore worth evaluating which factors mainly affect the size of desired debt.
From an econometric point of view, the estimation of desired debt requires taking into
account the widespread presence of zeros, which may actually represent different situations:
zero debt may reflect either the equilibrium solution for a family whose desired debt is non-
positive and is censored at zero; it may also represent the situation of a household that is
completely liquidity constrained, but whose desired debt is positive. Both an OLS regression
for the size of the loan estimated only for households with positive debt or an OLS for all the
observations, with zero included, lead to inconsistent estimates. It is therefore essential to37
consider the particular nature of these data and the different meanings of the zeros, i.e. the
limit observations (Maddala, 1983; Scott Long, 1997).
6.1   The Tobit model
We start the estimation of the size of desired debt with a Tobit model, whose general
formulation is:
(25)  e a + = 1
' * X D
* D D =   if    0
* > D
    0 = D     if    0
* £ D
In this specification all the households with non-positive desired debt are censored at
zero. The log likelihood is made up of two parts: one corresponding to the classical
regression model for the non-limit observations  0
* > D  and the other referring to the
probabilities for the limit observations  0
* £ D .
We express the dependent variable in logarithms in order to reduce heteroscedasticity
and measurement errors, assuming that desired debt is equal to a very small amount when it
is zero (Fishe et al., 1981; Maddala, 1983);
 22 income and net wealth are also transformed in
logarithm. In general, the evidence does not change substantially when the variables are
expressed in levels rather than in logarithms. Finally, we refer to panel estimations with
random effects, because a test on the variance component of each observation leads to the
result that it is significant and therefore the panel specification is the preferred one (Table
12).
The evidence in Table 12 is quite similar, both as regards the signs of the coefficients
and their significance, to the picture emerging from the probit model, which only analyzes
the determinants of participation in the debt market (see Table 7). The size of the debt is
concave in age, increases with current income and also rises when the variability of earnings
                                                            
22 Actually, we assign the observations with zero debt an amount of debt lower than the smallest figure
observable in the sample.38
is lower, whereas it appears to diminish for people living in regions where enforcement costs
are higher.
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Tobit specification is quite restrictive because
it imposes that both the decision to borrow and the decision concerning the size of the loan
depend on the same factors, which are also restricted to have the same sign (Cragg, 1971;
Fin and Schmidt, 1984). These hypotheses are unlikely to be always met. Moreover, in the
case under investigation, the  Tobit specification considers all the zero observations as
equilibrium solutions, representing non-positive desired debt, and it does not take into
account the possibility of rationing in the credit market (Leece, 1995).
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6.2   The two-stage Heckman model
In order to increase the flexibility of the model, it is possible to estimate the size of
desired debt in another way, based on a two-stage Heckman estimator (1979). In this
specification, the dependent variable of interest is observable only according to one or more
selection mechanisms.
In the case under examination, the regression equation of interest refers to the size of
desired debt:
(26) 1 1
' * e a + = X D
However, we do not always observe D* because the actual debt is subject to a double
selection mechanism.
24 Specifically, we observe the desired debt D* only if households enter
the debt market and if they are not liquidity constrained.
Therefore, first we have to consider a latent function determining whether a household
decides to borrow:
                                                            
23 Fabbri and Padula (2001) estimate a Tobit model not allowing for the desired debt to be negative and then
they consider a non-random sample correction in the Tobit estimation for the fact that the desired debt for
totally rationed households is unobservable.
24 In the following part we follow the estimation procedure of desired debt used by Cox and Jappelli (1993)
and Duca and Rosenthal (1993).39
(27) Prob [ 0 > D ] =    1 2
' ) ( m g + F X     
where  D is the observed debt and  2 X  contains all the variables in  1 X , affecting the size of
desired debt, and also some additional factors that may influence the fixed costs related to
market entry. The corresponding binary variable that we may observe is:
D=1            if  0 > D
D=0            otherwise
A second latent function concerns the probability that the debt ceiling set by the bank
A* exceeds D*, leaving the household not constrained in the credit market
(28)  Prob [ * * D A > ] =    2 3
' ) ( m h + F X     
whose the observable counterpart binary variable is
NLC=1      if  * * D A >
NLC=0      otherwise
D* is the household’s desired debt and A* is the optimal amount of the loan for the lender:
in  3 X we should therefore have the determinants of desired debt and the debt ceiling fixed by
the bank.
Summing up, in the case under investigation, we are able to observe the size of desired
debt D* only if the household has a positive actual debt and is not rationed in the credit
market. 
In the estimation of the model we assume that  ] [ 2 1 1 m m e  is distributed as a trivariate





























The expected value of the error in the equation (26) is equal to:40
(30) 
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where 
1 , 1 m M  and 
2 , 1 m M are functions of   1 'X a ,  2
'X g ,   3
'X h  and 
2 1,m m s . In the special case
when 
2 1,m m s =0, i.e. the correlation between the errors in the probit models is equal to zero,
they may be estimated independently and the two functions 
1 , 1 m M  and 
2 , 1 m M collapse to the
so-called Mills Ratio. In the more general case when 
2 1,m m s  is different from zero, we have
to estimate a bivariate probit model and then calculate 
1 , 1 m M  and 
2 , 1 m M , whose expression
are reported in the Appendix (Duca and Rosenthal, 1993; Maddala, 1983).
Hence, the conditional expectation of desired debt D* can be expressed as follows:
(31) 
2 2 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1 1
' * * ) 1 , 1 / * ( m m m m s s a M M X NLC D D E + + = = =
Therefore, from an econometric point of view, we first estimate two probit models or a
bivariate probit model for the two selection mechanisms and then we calculate the correction
terms for non-random selection. In the second stage, we consider only households with
positive amount of debt and not liquidity constrained to estimate the desired size of a loan,
also including the correction terms. This correction is essential in order to avoid an omitted
variable specification problem and is not required only if the errors in the probit model and
in the size equation are not correlated, i.e. 
1 , 1 m s and 
2 , 1 m s are equal to zero (Greene, 1997).
In this specification it is necessary to identify the model for the desired size of loan vis
à  vis the model for the decision to borrow. The hypothesis is that living in a small
municipality, with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, is an important factor in modelling the
entry costs in the debt market and thus for the decision whether or not to borrow, but that
this is not an important factor in the decision concerning the amount of desired debt. This
variable is therefore omitted in estimating the debt’s size.
Table 13 reports the results for the desired debt obtained with the panel specification,
the preferred one as the hypothesis that the variance contribution by each household is not
significant is rejected by the  Breusch-Pagan test.  Hausman test is also not rejected: this
means that the differences between the panel estimation with fixed and random effects are
not greatly significant and because the latter estimator uses more information and is more41
efficient, the random effect panel estimation is the preferred specification. However, the
table also reports the evidence from the pooled estimation, because of the strong reduction in
the number of observation when using the panel dimension (only 1,949 households
compared with 6,334 pooling all the observations; see the Appendix for further details). As
the dependent variable is in logarithms, the effect should be interpreted as percentage
changes. Finally, the quadratic terms are excluded from the estimation as not significant and
standard errors are not corrected for the two-stage procedure.
The evidence is quite different from that based on the Tobit model. The table clearly
reflects the importance of net wealth and of variables modelling the future income profile in
determining the size of desired debt. The higher the level of net wealth, and consequently the
more collateral households can give to the lender, the larger the size of desired debt: the
estimated elasticity is around 0.3. Similar results have been found in other studies referring
to the United States.
 25 Moreover, ceteris paribus, the size of desired debt is larger by 17 per
cent when the head is high school graduate (also in Fabbri and Padula, 2001) and by 16 per
cent for each additional income earner in the household (Table 13, last column for two-stage
Heckman estimation).
Contrary to the Tobit model, current income has a negative effect on desired debt, with
an elasticity equal to 0.3: this is consistent with the fact that as actual resources increase,
households prefer to finance both the purchase of a house and of the consumer durables with
less debt. However, the evidence of previous studies is mixed on this point.
 26
Another important difference with respect to the Tobit specification concerns the self-
employment dummy coefficient, which is positive in the Heckman two-stage specification:
                                                            
25 Cox and Jappelli (1993) find a positive correlation between net wealth and the size of desired debt: a
dollar increase in the former raises desired debt by 23 cents and the elasticity of debt with respect to net wealth
at a sample mean is estimated equal to be equal to 0.78. They consider this result puzzling, because borrowing
to finance current consumption should imply a negative coefficient for net worth. Duca and Rosenthal (1993)
also find a positive correlation between net wealth and desired debt: a dollar increase in net wealth raises
desired debt by 12 cents, but in this case the authors have not a strong a priori on the sign of this relationship.
26 This is the same evidence found by Cox and Jappelli (1993): a dollar increase in current income reduces
desired debt by 29 cents; however, in contrast with our procedure, they use a direct measure of permanent
income, which has a positive influence on the size of debt, rather than an education dummy as an indirect
measure. For Duca and Rosenthal (1993) current income has a positive effect on desired size of debt.42
ceteris paribus, even if the volatility of their earnings is higher, self-employed workers
desire 32 per cent more debt than employees, probably in part for work-related purposes. In
the Tobit model this result was blurred by the fact that the coefficients of the decision to
borrow and those of the size choice are constrained to be the same: the negative sign for the
self-employment dummy in the decision to borrow (Table 7), which was essentially
determined by more stringent bank evaluation, prevailed on the positive sign that arises in
the equation of desired debt. This result is different from Fabbri and Padula (2001), but they
essentially estimate a Tobit model with a correction for non-random selection.
In further contrast with the Tobit model, dummies for residence are not significantly
different from zero. However, it is still true that the amount of desired debt falls in regions
where the recovered share of debt is lower: a 1 point increase in the recovered share rises the
amount of debt by 1.3 per cent and moving from a region where the recovered share is
minimum to a region where it is maximum reflects in an increase in the size of desired debt
of more than 50 per cent. In summary, this more general specification shows that residence
is relevant for the size of desired debt, essentially because of a different distribution of the
enforcement costs in the country. Likewise in Fabbri and Padula (2001) if the quality of
judicial enforcement worsens, the debt held by unconstrained households decreases.
As in the Tobit model, in the two-stage Heckman specification the interest rate has the
expected negative sign, even if its coefficient is not significant in the panel specification.
Apparently, after taking into account different variables affecting the demand for loans, its
cost is no longer a determinant factor. Finally, the sign of age is negative and an increase of
1 year at the mean reduces the size of desired debt by 1.2 per cent.
  27 As regards the
correction for non-random sample selection, in the pooled specification only the term
referring to the probit model for non-liquidity constrained households is significant with
negative sign, meaning that the unobservable factors increasing the probability of being non-
rationed also reduce the size of desired debt
 28 ; in the panel dimension no correction terms
are significantly different from zero.
                                                            
27 This is similar to the result obtained by Cox and Jappelli (1993) and Fabbri and Padula (2001).
28 A similar result is obtained by Cox and Jappelli (1993).43
*    *   *
To deepen the analysis we use two types of robustness checks. As already noted, net
wealth can be affected by simultaneity problems leading to inconsistent estimates and so
here too we try to use the lag of net wealth in the panel estimation. The reduction in the
number of observations (only around 1,000 households) may strongly influence and skew
the results, but this exercise is aimed only at verifying the change in the coefficient of net
wealth. It turns out that the coefficient of lagged net wealth is still significant, but of nearly
two thirds smaller; suggesting that in the previous estimates the reaction of the loan size to a
change in net wealth may have been overvalued (the estimation is not reported).
The second check consists in running two separate regressions, one for 1989-93 and
the other for 1995-98 (Table 14). We run two pooled regressions rather than the panel ones,
to avoid an excessive reduction in the observations. In the period 1989-93 we have 3,429
households and the most important difference concerns the enforcement costs, which do not
matter, while the negative effect of the interest rate is significant and strong; being self-
employed workers does not influence the size of desired debt. In the period 1995-98 (2,905
households) the share of recovered loans is significant in affecting the size of desired debt,
with a positive sign; the coefficient of the self-employment dummy is strongly significant
and positive; on the other hand, the education dummy and the interest rate no longer matter.
Summing up, in the recent period the size of desired debt appears to be substantially
higher for the self-employed and indirectly linked to the area of residence, essentially
through regionally differential enforcement costs.
7.   Final remarks
Combining the results of the estimations concerning  debt-market  participation, we
obtain a picture where different variables play an important role. Overall, the effects of direct
or indirect supply-side factors are very strong: in particular, the low percentage of Italian
households with debt may be due to credit rationing linked to the area of residence and to the
judicial enforcement of the loan contracts. Among the enforcement costs, we find that when
the recovery time increases, lenders become far more careful in selecting customers; this
effect has grown in the recent period and particularly concerns the South.44
Among the economic variables, net wealth is not so important as income. The latter
acts on both sides of the market in the same direction: the higher the level of income, the
higher the probability of debt. This is an interesting point, because in papers on other
countries the probability of debt is not frequently linked to current income. Education, which
should reflect the future income profile, is another important supply-side determinant and
also matters in the demand equation, essentially because it reduces the costs of gathering and
elaborating information.
As theory predicts, an increase in income uncertainty reduces the probability of
demanding a loan. However, for self-employed workers the negative sign in the debt
probability model is basically due to a more frequent rationing by lenders: self-employed
households are not less inclined to apply for credit. Another evidence is that age plays a very
important role, essentially on the demand side.
Again as theory predicts, the amount of  desired debt is influenced mainly by net
wealth and the level of education, reflecting permanent income. It is also affected by job
status, as self-employed workers desire larger loans.
In regions where the loan recovery rates are higher desired debt is larger. This seems to
be the only channel through which the residence area is at work, given that the dummy area,
which should reflect the economic background risk, is not significant. As in the case of
participation, the enforcement costs have increased in importance in the most recent period.Appendix
Information on the Survey of Household Income and Wealth
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), carried out by the Bank of Italy
every two years (except in 1998, when the interval was three years), collects information on
social and economic characteristics of households, in particular income, real and financial
assets and debts. Five surveys are used (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998) in this paper, all of
them referring to more than 8,000 households, except that of 1998 (7,147 households).
The basic survey unit is the household, defined as a group of individuals linked by ties
of blood, marriage or affection, sharing the same dwelling and pooling all or part of their
income. Individuals who live together solely for economic reasons are not considered
members of the same household.
The SHIW refers to a representative sample of the Italian population. The sampling is
in two stages, first municipalities and then households. Municipalities are divided into 51
strata, defined by 17 regions and 3 classes of population size (more than 40,000, 20,000 to
40,000, less than 20,000). In each strata, first the municipalities where interviews are to be
conducted are identified, including all those with more than 40,000 inhabitants and randomly
extracting the others. Second, the households to be interviewed are randomly selected from
the registry office.
The net response rate (ratio of answers to contacted households net of ineligible units)
was 38 per cent in 1989, 33 per cent in 1991, 58 per cent in 1993, 57 per cent in 1995 and 43
per cent in 1998.
According to the sampling design, each unit is assigned a weight inversely related to
its probability of being included in the sample; weights are then modified both to increase
the estimators’ accuracy and to adjust the sample’s structure to that of the population for
some important features.
Starting in 1989, in each survey some households are re-interviewed. The panel
component of the SHIW has increased over time: 15 per cent of the sample was re-
interviewed in 1989, 27 per cent in 1991, 43 per cent in 1993, 45 per cent in 1995 and 1998.46
The households included in the panel are selected with criteria similar to those
described above, except that in 1991 and 1993 they were chosen among those that had
previously expressed their willingness to being re-interviewed. Since 1995, new units
formed by persons leaving a household included in the panel are also included,
For a comparison with the national and financial accounts, see Brandolini (1999) and
Brandolini and  Cannari (1994). The latter also contains a detailed explanation on the
sampling design and measurement errors. Even if both income and net wealth are subject to
under-reporting compared with the national account data, the survey data match the time-
series of the aggregate wealth/income ratio fairly well.
The panel used in the estimation
The unbalanced rotating panel used in the estimation of participation in the debt
market is made up of 13,793 households, of which 33 per cent are interviewed twice, 26 per
cent three times, 30 per cent four times and 11 per cent five times.
The panel component of the SHIW used in the estimation of desired debt is made up of
1,949 non-credit rationed households with debt, of which 51 per cent are interviewed twice,
30 per cent three times, 16 per cent four times and only 3 per cent five times.
The questions used in the analysis
The question of the SHIW used in the first analysis concerning participation in the debt
market is:
1) We will now turn to debts (i.e. loans, mortgages, consumer credit, etc.) serving to
meet needs of the household and the house (do not consider debts in connection with your
business). At the end of 1998 (or the corresponding year) vis-à-vis banks or financial
companies or for instalment payments did your household have:
a) debts for the purchase or restructuring of buildings?
b) debts for the purchase of real goods (e.g. jewellery, gold, etc.)?47
c) debts for the purchase of motor vehicles (e.g. cars)?
d) debts for the purchase of furniture, electric appliances, etc.?
e) debts for the purchase of non-durable goods (holidays, furs, etc) or for other
reasons?
If the answer to previous question is yes for some categories, precise the amount.
These amounts are used in the analysis on the size of desired debt.
The question of the SHIW used in the second analysis concerning the participation in
the debt market is:
2) In 1998 (or the corresponding year) did your household apply to a bank or a
financial company for a loan or a mortgage?
Yes
No
This question is included only in the 1989, 1995 and 1998 surveys.




For the 1991 and 1993 surveys the choice is only between granted and rejected.48
4) In 1998 (or the corresponding year) did you or another member of your household
consider the possibility of applying to a bank or a financial company for a loan or a
mortgage but then change his/her mind thinking that the application would be rejected?
Yes
No
The variables used in the econometric analysis
Age: the age of the household head.
Net wealth: real assets plus financial assets minus financial liabilities for personal
needs, millions of lire at the 1995 prices.
Income: net disposable income, millions of lire at the 1995 prices. All income is
recorded net of payments of taxes and social security contributions.
Education: dummy=1 if the head of the household has attained a high school diploma
and 0 otherwise.
Self-employed: dummy=1 if the head of the household is either an entrepreneur or an
independent professional.
Number of income earners: number of people in the household who earn an income.
Expectation of retirement income: dummy=1 if the head of the household has marked
an age at which he will retire and he is younger than the retirement age.
Employee in a firm with fewer than 20 employees: dummy=1 if this is the case and 0
otherwise; this variable is available only since 1993.
Residence area: dummy Centre =1 if the residence area is in a region of central Italy
and =0 otherwise; dummy South=1 if the residence area is in a region of the southern Italy
and =0 otherwise.
Index of financial assets knowledge: this index is calculated (see Guiso and Jappelli,
2000) as the ratio between the number of assets that each household knows and the number49
of available assets (17 in total). Both the  unweighted and the weighted index have been
calculated, where the weights are the inverse of the aggregate share of the households
knowing each financial asset. This variable is available only for 1995 and 1998.
The Herfindahl index at a provincial basis: this index is calculated considering the
number of branches each bank has in a province and the total branches in the same province.
The information is drawn from Bank Supervisory Reports.
Length of the relationship with the bank: dummy=1 if between 5 and 10 years and =0
otherwise; this variable has been included in the survey since 1993.
The recovered share of the loan: the amount of the loan recovered in mortgage
proceedings for insolvency concerning the households, given in a questionnaire by a
representative sample of banks and referring to 1992-1993.
The recovery time: the time to recover a share of the loan with the same characteristics
as the previous variable.
Interest rates on loans: these provincial interest rates refer to the household sector and
are based on a sample of around 70 banks. They are calculated considering the province of
the branch (the only data available before 1997 in the Central Credit Register). They only
concern loans greater than 80 million lire (41,317 euros) up to 1995 and loans greater than
150 million lire (77,469 euros) thereafter.
Correction term for non-random selection
In this part of the Appendix the expressions for 
1 , 1 m M  and 
2 , 1 m M are shown, based on
the work by  Maddala (1983) and Duca and Rosenthal (1993). Assuming  2
'
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3
'
2 X k h - = , 
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and  gand G  are the standard bivariate normal density and distribution functions.
Expressions (a.3) and (a.4) can be simplified (Duca and Rosenthal, 1993) as:




2 1 2 1 1 k k G k F k f k F k f P - - - + - = m m m s




1 2 2 1 2 k k G k F k f k F k f P - - - + - = m m m s
where




1 2 1 2 1 m m m m s s - - = k k k




2 2 1 2 1 m m m m s s - - = k k k
and  f  and   F  are the unit normal density and cumulative function. 
1 , 1 m M and 
2 , 1 m M
depends on the parameters  g , h and 
2 m m s  that can be estimated from a bivariate probit.Tables and Figures
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Germany 74.0 42.9 27.2 22.5
Italy 30.0 19.1 9.0 12.2
Netherlands 65.7 42.6 32.0
United Kingdom 77.0 31.8(45.0) 14.2
Spain 56.0
United States 76.0 74.3 43.1 48.5
Source: The ratios between financial liabilities and GDP are taken from the Bank of Italy’s Annual Report for
2001 and refer to 2000 (Spain refers to 1999). Participation in the debt market is determined on the
basis of sample surveys: for the United Kingdom, the 1997/1998 Financial Research Survey and, for
figures in brackets, the 1996 Family Expenditure Survey; for the United States, the 1998 Survey of
Consumer Finance; for Germany, the 1993 Income and Expenditure Survey, and data refer only to
West Germany; for the Netherlands, the 1998 CentER Savings Survey; for Italy the 1998, Survey of
Household Income and Wealth.
Table 2
SHARE OF ITALIAN HOUSEHOLDS WITH DEBT (1)
(debt with banks and other financial companies)

































11.5 17.3 20.1 20.5 19.1
Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth. (1) The frequencies are weighted and refer to the whole
sample of households.52
Table 3
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH DEBT FOR PERSONAL NEEDS
ACCORDING TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS (1)
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 Number of
households in 1998
Sex of the head
Male 12.9 19.4 23.4 24,4 21,9 5,142
Woman 5.8 9.4 11.9 10.6 11.8 2,005
Age of the head
Up to 30 years 19.1 23.5 26.3 34.2 28.0 351
31 to 40 years 20.3 28.3 33.1 31.9 31.2 1,251
41 to 50 years 16.4 27.2 29.9 30.9 29.6 1,415
51 to 65 years 9.4 14.3 18.1 19.8 17.6 1,924
Older that 65 years 2.2 5.2 5.1 4.8 5.3 2,206
Education of the head
Without education 3.1 4.7 5.9 5.1 6.1 655
Primary school 8.8 11.6 13.6 12.2 11.6 2,095
Junior high school 12.5 22.1 26.4 26.6 23.6 1,896
High school 16.8 24.8 28.7 29.7 26.2 1,946
Degree 18.1 23.2 25.0 28.5 21.9 542
Specialization after degree 20.4 19.3 22.2 50.2 20.9 13
Job status of the head
Employee 18.0 26.3 32.6 33.2 29.1 2,360
Self-employed 12.5 20.3 23.3 28.3 29.2 1,206
Non worker 4.4 7.5 9.3 9.2 9.1 3,580
Quartiles of income
First quartile 5.1 6.1 10.6 10.5 9.6 2,106
Second quartile 11,7 17.7 19.3 17.6 18.4 1,798
Third quartile 14.6 22.1 24.7 25.8 25.9 1,630
Fourth quartile 15.5 23.4 26.9 29.2 25.4 1,613
Size of the municipality
Up to 20,000 inhabitants 10.8 16.3 18.4 16.2 15.6 3,470
20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants 10.7 17.3 21.7 19.9 20.8 902
40,000 to 500,000 inhabitants 11.7 18.9 22.0 25.6 22.0 1,785
More than 500,000 inhabitants 14.6 17.2 21.4 27.1 24.4 990
Geographical areas
North West 13.2 21.3 18.1 19.8 18.1 2,098
North East 9.0 16.0 18.3 21.4 20.1 1,335
Centre 12.4 18.1 27.5 25.9 22.6 1,362
South 10.7 14.0 19.5 17.4 15.3 1,563
Islands 11.8 13.6 17.5 17.9 21.5 789
Quartiles of financial assets
First quartile 8.2 12.1 20.0 18.0 15.1 1,909
Second quartile 15.0 20.1 27.6 23.1 21.3 1,725
Third quartile 14.6 19.9 17.1 22.4 23.1 1,758
Fourth quartile 10.1 16.8 15.5 18.3 17.2 1,756
Quartiles of real assets
First quartile 8.1 12.3 12.4 12.1 15.2 1,883
Second quartile 9.4 10.3 17.8 13.7 15.9 1,874
Third quartile 14.2 21.5 24.4 28.3 22.3 1,637
Fourth quartile 14.7 25.0 26.2 28.7 23.7 1,75353
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 Number of
households in 1998
Quartiles of net wealth
First quartile 10.8 14.3 16.0 13.8 17.0 1,929
Second quartile 10.1 11.1 19.0 17.1 17.8 1,784
Third quartile 12.3 20.2 22.7 26.7 20.3 1,687
Fourth quartile 13.1 23.2 22.9 24.7 21.6 1,746
Number of households’
members
1 member 5.8 7.8 5.9 6.3 9.1 1,479
2 members 7.7 10.6 12.3 14.2 13.1 1,915
3 members 13.8 22.9 23.3 24.1 22.8 1,652
4 members 14.9 23.6 31.6 31.5 28.8 1,513
5 and more members 17.3 21.5 29.0 29.1 28.4 589
Number of income earners
1 earner 10.0 14.6 16.4 15.9 15.1 3,343
2 earners 13.2 19.1 22.4 24.5 22.4 2,870
3 earners 11.4 19.6 24.9 20.9 24.6 738
4 earners and more 13.0 21.0 27.0 26.8 17.3 196
Attitude toward risk on
financial investments (2)
Class 0 (0 or only AA) 10.5 14.0 18.2 16.9 14.9 4,169
Class 1 (AA/ BB – only BB –
all three AA/BB/CC)
13.8 21.0 22.9 24.2 24.7 2,179
Class 2 (AA/ CC or BB/CC or
only CC)
13.0 32.2 22.3 28.8 25.7 800
Portfolio combinations (2)
1 = no financial assets 5.5 3.9 10.2 9.6 6.7 945
2= only AA 11.6 16.5 20.8 19.5 17.3 3,224
3= only BB 10.8 9.5 29.5 35.4 23.0 47
4= only CC 0.0 47.3 31.6 27.5 25.1 11
5= AA and BB 14.1 20.0 23.8 23.7 25.4 1,279
6= AA and CC 13.2 32.1 22.3 28.3 25.7 788
7= BB and CC 100 0.0 0.0 69.6 100 1
8= AA, BB and CC 13.3 24.1 20.4 24.0 23.6 853
Total 11.5 17.3 20.1 20.5 19.1 7,147
Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth. (1)The frequencies are weighted and refer to the whole
sample; all the 5 categories of debt mentioned in Table 2 are considered. – (2) For financial assets, AA
marks the category without risk, BB fairly safe assets and CC risky financial assets. The index that
measures the attitude toward risk has a qualitative nature and is based on three groups of 8 different
portfolio combinations: the first group includes all the households with either no financial assets or
only safe assets AA (deposits); the second those that hold fairly safe financial assets BB (short-term
bonds and life insurance) or the combination AA/BB and AA/BB/CC; the third those that have only
risky assets CC (long-term bonds, shares, mutual funds, other form of asset management and pension
funds) and the combinations AA/CC and BB/CC.54
Table 4
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF DEBT FOR PERSONAL NEEDS ACCORDING TO
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS (1)
(only households with debt – data in euros)
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 Number of
households
in 1998
Sex of the head
Male 8,479 11,342 13,882 14,726 14,780 1294
Woman 6,638 7,770 10,863 11,207 12,652 260
Age of the head
Up to 30 years 8,581 14,123 12,276 12,750 9,005 94
31 to 40 years 8,612 12,249 13,994 17,197 15,023 398
41 to 50 years 8,807 11,365 13,365 13,140 17,289 493
51 to 65 years 7,482 9,483 14,318 14,109 13,922 461
Older that 65 years 6,513 5,951 8,957 8,880 8,029 108
Education of the head
Without education 2,654 6,566 7,813 7,917 7,051 35
Primary school 7,475 8,909 10,674 11,655 11,074 274
Junior high school 7,369 9,717 13,380 12,965 10,395 490
High school 10,138 12,761 14,410 15,071 18,581 600
Degree 7,576 15,766 20,550 19,644 20,913 151
Specialization after degree 29,295 10,167 6,739 74,865 15,522 4
Job status of the head
Employee 8,655 11,280 12,991 14,230 13,733 845
Self-employed 8,625 13,311 19,014 17,530 20,878 312
Non worker 6,293 6,973 9,079 10,804 8,853 397
Quartiles of household’s
income
First quartile 7,596 12,213 13,407 9,887 9,153 202
Second quartile 7,440 7,388 9,940 12,399 10,800 373
Third quartile 7,721 9,940 12,535 13,547 14,940 480
Fourth quartile 9,773 13,900 16,691 17,622 19,350 499
Size of the municipality
Up to 20,000 inhabitants 8,380 11,256 14,270 14,112 15,042 346
20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants 6,732 10,938 10,550 12,323 14,496 348
40,000 to 500,000 inhabitants 8,594 10,333 12,866 13,598 14,909 626
More than 500,000 inhabitants 8,550 11,112 14,481 16,967 12,118 234
Geographical areas
North West 8,575 11,448 17,082 15,553 16,777 359
North East 9,824 12,948 14,954 16,318 18,484 300
Centre 8,925 10,615 11,716 14,633 12,520 371
South 7,094 8,138 10,645 10,191 10,646 301
Islands 6,488 11,337 10,421 12,669 11,388 223
Quartiles of financial assets
First quartile 7,327 10,107 12,030 10,408 11,073 345
Second quartile 7,995 10,532 12,330 13,419 14,355 435
Third quartile 8,570 10,153 17,390 15,540 13,511 429
Fourth quartile 9,248 12,717 12,544 17,128 18,856 34555




Quartiles of real assets
First quartile 4,527 4,688 4,083 3,761 4,259 281
Second quartile 4,625 8,776 9,179 8,456 10,688 343
Third quartile 10,625 11,349 13,961 15,274 13,730 445
Fourth quartile 10,610 14,169 20,176 20,756 24,688 485
Quartiles of net wealth
First quartile 6,926 6,577 8,005 4,583 6,899 311
Second quartile 7,890 11,245 12,188 14,261 13,973 398
Third quartile 8,659 10,886 12,988 14,034 14,241 405
Fourth quartile 9,392 13,084 18,609 19,843 21,459 440
Attitude toward risk on
financial investments (2)
Class 0 (0 or only AA) 7,815 9,874 12,940 12,844 10,499 689
Class 1 (AA/ BB – only BB –
all three AA/BB/CC) 9,510 11,956 13,958 14,558 18,218 637
Class 2 (AA/ CC or BB/CC or
only CC) 5,285 11,901 13,493 19,366 16,267 228
Portfolios combinations (2)
1 = no financial assets 2,409 6,649 8,372 9,329 5,210 86
2= only AA 8,389 10,063 13,648 13,473 11,096 603
3= only BB 6,028 14,256 12,304 11,381 9,385 12
4= only CC 0,000 6,405 10,329 23,785 25,823 2
5= AA and BB 9,865 10,978 14,001 13,835 17,461 377
6= AA and CC 5,301 12,051 13,550 19,084 16,175 224
7= BB and CC 3,615 0,000 0,000 19,898 7,952 2
8= AA, BB and CC 8,637 13,971 13,950 16,559 19,910 248
Total 8,298 10,931 13,383 14,209 14,410 1554
Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth. (1)The frequencies are weighted and refer to the whole
sample; all the 5 categories of debt mentioned in Table 2 are considered. – (2) For financial assets, AA
marks the category without risk, BB fairly safe assets and CC risky financial assets. The index that
measures the attitude toward risk has a qualitative nature and is based on three groups of 8 different
portfolio combinations: the first group includes all the households with either no financial assets or
only safe assets AA (deposits); the second those that hold fairly safe financial assets BB (short-term
bonds and life insurance) or the combination AA/BB and AA/BB/CC; the third those that have only
risky assets CC (long-term bonds, shares, mutual funds, other form of asset management and pension
funds) and the combinations AA/CC and BB/CC.56
Table 5
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF MORTGAGES
ACCORDING TO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS (1)
(only households with mortgages – data in euros)
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 Number of
households
in 1998
Sex of the head
Male 13,016 15,060 19,069 19,951 22,843 667
Woman 10,311 10,566 16,711 14,736 21,725 122
Age of the head
Up to 30 years 18,199 17,998 20,203 20,991 26,263 35
31 to 40 years 12,965 17,403 20,617 24,006 23,835 211
41 to 50 years 12,672 13,984 17,423 17,174 23,930 267
51 to 65 years 11,448 13,979 18,689 17,928 21,600 228
Older that 65 years 9,135 6,843 14,528 11,395 13.831 48
Education of the head
Without education 5,445 9,575 17,657 11,035 9,248 10
Primary school 11,663 12,530 17,685 16,519 16,625 108
Junior high school 10,784 13,149 18,210 17,279 18,023 228
High school 15,000 15,841 18,219 19,996 27,104 343
Degree 12,103 20,165 25,674 25,057 28,977 98
Specialization after degree 29,295 11,355 7,676 82,948 18,225 2
Job status of the head
Employee 13,303 15,104 18,103 19,756 22,540 447
Self-employed 13,747 18,307 24,366 21,599 30,808 158
Non worker 9,229 8,512 14,037 14,908 13,802 184
Quartiles of household’s
income
First quartile 14,915 20,379 24,631 18,729 17,422 78
Second quartile 12,204 9,186 16,217 17,554 17,763 159
Third quartile 10,906 13,164 16,800 17,937 26,121 251
Fourth quartile 14,287 17,684 19,892 21,055 24,478 301
Size of the municipality
Up to 20,000 inhabitants 13,172 15,041 19,720 18,923 22,607 175
20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants 10,514 14,992 14,751 19,142 22,705 180
40,000 to 500,000 inhabitants 12,575 13,937 18,546 17,518 23,750 324
More than 500,000 inhabitants 13,216 14,075 19,498 22,808 20,761 110
Geographical areas
North West 12,816 15,393 24,220 19,326 23,501 193
North East 13,721 17,453 20,614 20,110 32,671 166
Centre 14,404 13,763 15,292 19,381 19,799 176
South 12,610 11,067 15,711 17,240 16,032 152
Islands 8,674 13,731 14,917 18,892 17,962 102
Quartiles of financial assets
First quartile 12,834 12,960 20,063 16,625 19,811 152
Second quartile 12,213 14,135 18,058 18,368 24,391 222
Third quartile 12,668 13,341 22,072 20,286 21,211 219
Fourth quartile 13,293 17,226 14,863 20,503 24,760 19657
1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 Number of
households
in 1998
Quartile of real assets
First quartile 10,354 4,638 11,819 8,940 5,112 31
Second quartile 9,397 11,818 14,626 13,091 14,573 166
Third quartile 13,929 14,204 16,347 17,817 20,274 274
Fourth quartile 12,955 16,740 23,059 23,040 31,565 318
Quartiles of net wealth
First quartile 16,740 12,862 25,595 12,049 14,914 51
Second quartile 14,457 14,095 17,605 20,125 20,255 223
Third quartile 11,323 13,700 15,269 16,460 22,055 236
Fourth quartile 11,881 15,760 21,437 22,335 27,015 279
Attitude toward risk on
financial investments (2)
class 0 (0 or only AA) 12,750 13,598 19,014 18,542 16,726 325
class 1 (AA/ BB – only BB –
all three AA/BB/CC) 12,979 15,593 18,195 18,523 26,199 356
class 2 (AA/ CC or BB/CC or
only CC) 9,669 14,405 19,746 26,074 30,491 108
Portfolios combinations (2)
1 = no financial assets 4,268 10,301 17,517 17,232 11,077 27
2= only AA 13,180 13,718 19,152 18,698 17,105 298
3= only BB 1,706 18,696 15,225 18,006 15,425 3
4= only CC 0,000 6,257 10,329 31,293 25,823 2
5= AA and BB 13,339 14,204 19,035 17,673 27,095 198
6= AA and CC 9,669 14,705 20,029 26,014 30,695 105
7= BB and CC 0,000 0,000 0,000 20,131 15,494 1
8= AA, BB and CC 12,427 18,256 16,509 20,145 25,417 155
Total 12,747 14,584 18,719 19,191 22,660 789
Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth. (1)The frequencies are weighted and refer to the whole
sample; all the 5 categories of debt mentioned in Table 2 are considered. – (2) For financial assets, AA
marks the category without risk, BB fairly safe assets and CC risky financial assets. The index that
measures the attitude toward risk has a qualitative nature and is based on three groups of 8 different
portfolio combinations: the first group includes all the households with either no financial assets or
only safe assets AA (deposits); the second those that hold fairly safe financial assets BB (short-term
bonds and life insurance) or the combination AA/BB and AA/BB/CC; the third those that have only
risky assets CC (long-term bonds, shares, mutual funds, other form of asset management and pension
funds) and the combinations AA/CC and BB/CC.58
Table  6
THE ENFORCEMENT COSTS FOR LOAN CONTRACTS
IN ITALIAN REGIONS (1)
Regions Recovery time Regions Recovery share
(in months) (in percentage)
Valle d’Aosta 18.0 Calabria 84.5
Trentino Alto Adige 34.9 Basilicata 82.5
Liguria 49.2 Veneto 72.8
Friuli Venezia Giulia 51.5 Friuli Venezia Giulia 70.3
Umbria 53.2 Umbria 70.1
Piedmont 54.6 Sicily 70.1
Lombardy 55.8 Sardinia 67.5
Veneto 56.0 Trentino Alto Adige 66.8
Tuscany 60.0 Piedmont 65.5
Emilia Romagna 63.8 Molise 65.0
Lazio 64.4 Emilia Romagna 63.0
Calabria 65.6 Lombardy 60.4
Abruzzo 67.4 Tuscany 60.0
Campania 68.8 Puglia 59.9
Molise 73.5 Campania 57.6
Sardinia 77.0 Liguria 57.5
Basilicata 82.4 Lazio 57.3
Puglia 82.8 Abruzzo 52.6
Marche 88.8 Marche 41.0
Sicily 91.2 Valle d’Aosta 40.0
Italy 62.9 63.2
Source: Bank of Italy questionnaire for a representative sample of banks referring to the years 1992-93. Only
mortgage proceedings for insolvency are considered. (1) Southern regions are in bold, northern regions
in italics59
Table  7
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBT MARKET (1)
(pooled and panel probit random effect estimation  - 1989-1998)
Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects
pooled estimation panel estimation panel estimation
Age 0.012 ( 7.53) 0.017 ( 5.07) 0.017 ( 5.13)
Age squared -0.178 (-10.1) -0.238 (-6.71) -0.238 (-6.74)
Income 0.003  ( 8.89) 0.003  ( 4.51) 0.003  ( 5.11)
Income squared -0.000 (-7.57) -0.000 (-3.76) -0.000 (-3.86)
Net wealth 0.000 ( 4.99) 0.000 ( 1.01)
Net wealth squared -0.000 (-4.34) -0.000 (-0.12)
Retirement income 0.035 ( 5.47) 0.030 ( 2.78) 0.029 ( 2.68)
Self-employed -0.025 (-4.32) -0.030 (-2.75) -0.026 (-2.40)
No. of income earners 0.014 ( 4.07) 0.020 ( 3.22) 0.018 ( 2.96)
Married 0.051 ( 8.46) 0.064 ( 5.50) 0.064 ( 5.54)
No. of children 0.009 ( 3.35) 0.004 ( 0.85) 0.004 ( 0.86)
High school education 0.017 ( 3.23) 0.024 ( 2.39) 0.025 ( 2.50)
High risk in financial
investment
0.021 ( 2.43) 0.009 ( 0.64) 0.009 ( 0.66)
Mun. <20,000 inhab. -0.037 (- 6.86) -0.037 (-3.43) -0.036 (-3.31)
Centre 0.031 (  4.28) 0.083 ( 4.81) 0.084 ( 4.89)
South -0.002 (- 0.17) 0.013 ( 0.69) 0.013 ( 0.71)
Herfindahl index on a
provincial basis
0.131 ( 3.51) 0.201 ( 2.76) 0.201 ( 2.76)
Loan interest rate 0.001 ( 0.21) -0.010 (-1.63) -0.010 (-1.66)
Recovered share 0.001 ( 4.23) 0.002 ( 3.16) 0.002 ( 3.17)
Recovery time 0.000 ( 0.30) 0.001 (-1.10) 0.001 (-1.10)
Number of observations 32,588 13,793 13,793
Period of time 1989-1998 1989-1998 1989-1998
Predicted probability 0.186 0.141 0.141
Pseudo R squared 0.075
Prob Wald chi2 (all the
Coefficients = 0)
0.000 0.000
Prob Likelihood ratio test
?=0  (the panel-level
variance is =0)
0.000 0.000
(1) All the regressions include a constant and time dummies. T test are reported in brackets; in the pooled
estimation standard errors are robust against heteroscedasticity and are calculated with the White method.
Marginal effects are expressed at the mean value of the independent variables. The dummy “high risk in
financial investment” is equal to 1 for households with risky combination of financial investments, such as
either AA-CC or BB-CC or only CC, where AA marks safe financial assets, BB fairly safe financial assets and
CC risky financial assets. The Herfindahl index is calculated considering the number of branches and on a
provincial basis; the interest rate on loans is measured on a provincial basis and refers to households’ loans. The
data on the recovery of financing are on a regional basis. The dummy South is equal to 1 for the households that
live in the southern regions and 0 otherwise. The Likelihood ratio test is a test on the significance of the panel-
level variance component and formally compares the pooled estimator with the panel estimator. For further
information on the variables and about the panel component of the SHIW, see the Appendix.60
Table  8
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBT MARKET: INFORMATION ON
FINANCIAL ASSETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BANK AND WORKING IN
SMALL FIRMS
(panel probit random effect estimation  - different periods)
Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects
Age 0.021 ( 2.59) 0.022 ( 4.18) 0.023 ( 4.42)
Age squared -0.276 (-3.30) -0.292 (-5.39) -0.301 (-5.56)
Income 0.005  ( 3.61) 0.004  ( 4.24) 0.003  ( 4.36)
Income squared -0.000 (-3.19) -0.000 (-3.59) -0.000 (-3.67)
Net wealth 0.000 (-1.02) 0.000 (-0.29) 0.000 (-0.25)
Net wealth squared 0.000 (-1.43) 0.000 ( 0.65) 0.000 ( 0.62)
Retirement income 0.059 ( 2.42) 0.052 ( 3.27) 0.046 ( 3.00)
Self-employed -0.018 (-0.71) -0.024 (-1.38) -0.018 (-1.03)
No. of income earners 0.013 ( 0.95) 0.016 ( 1.82) 0.015 ( 1.72)
Married 0.100 ( 3.96) 0.080 ( 4.76) 0.080 ( 4.77)
No. of children -0.003 (-0.26) 0.005 ( 0.66) 0.005 ( 0.62)
High school education 0.029 ( 1.35) 0.032 ( 2.16) 0.033 ( 2.22)
High risk in financial
investment
-0.031 (-1.21) -0.004 ( -0.22) -0.005 (-0.25)
Mun. <20,000 inhab. -0.075 (-3.39) -0.055 (-3.54) -0.053 (-3.42)
Centre 0.080 ( 2.42) 0.093 ( 3.73) 0.092 ( 3.71)
South -0.014 (-0.33) -0.008 (-0.28) -0.009 (-0.32)
Herfindahl index on a
provincial basis
0.043 (0.28) 0.255 ( 2.37) 0.261 ( 2.43)
Loan interest rate 0.010 ( 0.78) -0.002 (-0.29) -0.002 (-0.26)
Recovered share 0.005 ( 3.59) 0.003 ( 2.91) 0.003 ( 2.89)




Working in a firm with
fewer than 20 employees
-0.034 (-1.71)
Relationship with bank
between 5 and 10 years
0.041 ( 3.02)
Number of observations 3,696 7,536 7,536
Period of time 1995-1998 1993-1998 1993-1998
Predicted probability 0.186 0.155 0.155
Prob Wald chi2 (all the
coefficients=0)
0.000 0.000 0.000




(1) For the construction of the index, see the Appendix.61
Table 9
PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBT MARKET: EFFECT OF EDUCATION
AND ANALYSIS ON TWO SUBPERIODS
(panel probit random effect estimation – different periods)
Marginal effects Marginal effects Marginal effects
1989-1993 1995-1998
Age 0.017 ( 4.82) 0.014 ( 3.51) 0.021 ( 2.69)
Age squared -0.240 (-6.43) -0.205 (-4.74) -0.288 (-3.44)
Income 0.003  ( 4.51) 0.002  (2.49) 0.005  (4.09)
Income squared -0.000 (-3.76) -0.000 (-2.10) -0.000 (-3.45)
Net wealth 0.000 (-1.01) 0.000  (1.95) -0.000  (-0.82)
Net wealth squared 0.000 (-0.12) -0.000 (-1.24) 0.000 ( 1.29)
Retirement income 0.030 ( 2.78) 0.025  (1.80) 0.060  (2.45)
Self-employed -0.030 (-2.75) -0.041 (-3.23) -0.018 (-0.70)
No. of income earners 0.020 ( 3.22) 0.027 ( 3.52) 0.010 ( 0.72)
Married 0.064 ( 5.50) 0.043  (3.04) 0.102  (4.02)
No. of children 0.004 ( 0.85) 0.009 ( 1.42) -0.004 (-0.33)
High school education 0.018 ( 1.53) 0.036 ( 1.67)
High school*age1 (1) 0.026 ( 1.64)
High school*age2 0.024 ( 1.92)
High school*age3 0.032 ( 0.76)
High risk in financial
investment
0.009 ( 0.64) 0.021 ( 1.05) -0.029 (-1.10)
Mun. <20,000 inhab. -0.037 ( -3.43) -0.024 (-1.95) -0.078 (-3.50)
Centre 0.083 ( 4.81) 0.064 ( 3.07) 0.077 ( 2.32)
South 0.013 ( 0.69) 0.020 ( 0.95) -0.024 (-0.58)
Herfindahl index on a
provincial basis
0.201 ( 2.76) 0.164 ( 1.91) 0.074 ( 0.49)
Loan interest rate -0.010 (-1.63) -0.017 (-2.08) 0.009 ( 0.73)
Recovered share 0.002 ( 3.16) 0.001 ( 2.07) 0.005 ( 3.57)
Recovery time 0.001 (-1.10) -0.000 (-0.68) 0.000 ( 0.00)
Number of observations 13,793 7,824 3,696
Period of time 1989-1998 1989-1993 1995-1993
Predicted probability 0.141 0.121 0.187
Prob Wald chi2 (all the
Coefficients=0)
0.000 0.000 0.000




(1) Age1= the head is aged 20 to 40; age2= 40 to 65; age3=above 6562
Table 10
PARTICIPATION IN THE MORTGAGE AND CONSUMER LOAN MARKET









Age 0.010 ( 8.13) 0.004 ( 3.22) 0.010 ( 8.13) 0.004 ( 3.37)
Age squared -0.136 (-9.97) -0.065 (- 5.11) -0.136 (-9.97) -0.067 (-5.25)
Income 0.001 ( 4.99) 0.002 (  8.20)
Income squared 0.000 (-4.70) -0.000 (- 6.51)
1° quintile income 0.001 (-1.21) 0.000 ( 0.04)
2° quintile income 0.000 ( 0.97) 0.001 ( 2.89)
3° quintile income 0.001 ( 1.99) 0.001 ( 3.64)
4° quintile income 0.000 ( 2.31) 0.001 ( 4.13)
5° quintile income 0.000 ( 1.29) 0.001 ( 4.52)
Net wealth 0.000 ( 16.4) 0.000 (-11.1) 0.000 ( 17.1) 0.000 (-10.2)
Net wealth squared 0.000 (-10.9) 0.000 ( 8.63) 0.000 (-11.4) 0.000 ( 7.45)
Retirement income 0.021 ( 4.31) 0.017 ( 3.71) 0.021 ( 4.42) 0.019 ( 4.05)
Self-employed -0.029 (-6.92) 0.005 ( 1.20) -0.029 (-7.05) 0.004 ( 0.98)
No. of income earners 0.008 ( 3.75) 0.008 ( 3.33) 0.009 ( 3.66) 0.011 ( 4.73)
Married 0.034 ( 7.40) 0.021 ( 4.85) 0.034 ( 7.35) 0.022 ( 5.04)
No. of children 0.003 ( 1.67) 0.005 ( 2.45) 0.003 ( 1.64) 0.005 ( 2.40)
High school education 0.023 ( 5.96) -0.006 (-1.51) 0.023 ( 6.12) -0.004 (-1.00)
High risk in financial
investment
0.004 ( 0.63) 0.021 ( 3.34) 0.004 ( 0.69) 0.023 ( 3.52)
Mun. <20,000 inhab. -0.017 (-4.35) -0.023 (-5.94) -0.018 (-4.45) -0.023 (-6.09)
Centre 0.013 ( 2.34) 0.027 ( 5.04) 0.012 ( 2.28) 0.027 ( 4.97)
South -0.007 (-0.96) 0.013 ( 1.84) -0.007 (-0.92) 0.012 ( 1.75)
Herfindahl index on a
provincial basis
0.067 ( 2.39) 0.080 ( 2.99) 0.065 ( 2.32) 0.080 ( 3.00)
Loan interest rate -0.005 (-1.91) 0.004 ( 1.46) -0.005 (-1.91) 0.003 ( 1.42)
Recovered share 0.001 ( 4.86) 0.001 ( 2.71) 0.001 ( 4.76) 0.001 ( 2.55)
Recovery time 0.000 ( 0.98) -0.000 (-0.10) 0.000 ( 0.92) -0.000 (-0.24)
Number of observations 32,588 32,588 32,588 32,588
Period of time 1989-1998 1989-1998 1989-1998 1989-1998
Predicted probability 0.098 0.090 0.098 0.090
Prob Wald test all the
Coefficients =0
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob Wald test no
correlation between
decisions
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob Wald test the




THE PROBABILITY OF DEMANDING A LOAN AND OF BEING CREDIT
RATIONED
 (pooled probit estimation 1989-1993-1995)
Loan demand Marginal effects Credit rationing Marginal effects Marginal effects
without dummy area
Age 0.002 ( 3.06) Age 0.001 ( 0.56) 0.001 ( 0.97)
Age squared -0.038 (-5.24)
Income 0.001 ( 3.02) Income -0.002 (-3.44) -0.002 (-3.71)
Income squared 0.000 (-3.10)
Net wealth 0.000 (-1.00) Net wealth 0.001 ( 0.00) 0.000 (-0.04)
Net wealth squared 0.000 ( 2.09)
Retirement income 0.006 ( 1.57) Retirement income -0.042 (-1.67) -0.041 (-1.60)
Self-employed 0.006 ( 1.83) Self-employed 0.055 ( 2.43) 0.054 ( 2.36)
No. of income earners 0.008 ( 3.78) No. of income
earners
0.002 ( 1.42) 0.014 ( 1.16)
Married 0.008 ( 2.12) Married -0.091 (-3.33) -0.074 (-2.77)
No. of children 0.003 ( 1.99) No. of children 0.016 (1.82) 0.021 ( 2.36)
High school education 0.005 ( 1.66) High school
education
-0.045 (-2.41) -0.042 (-2.22)
High risk in financial
investment
-0.006 (-1.27) High risk in
financial
investment
Mun. <20,000 inhab. -0.015 (-5.00) Mun. <20,000
inhab.
0.003 ( 0.12) 0.003 ( 0.12)
Centre 0.010 ( 2.41) Centre 0.038 ( 1.40)
South -0.005 (-0.80) South 0.128 ( 3.68)
Herfindahl index 0.016 ( 0.75) Herfindahl index -0.219 ( -1.60) -0.118 (-0.87)
Loan interest rate 0.003 ( 1.65)
Recovered share 0.001 ( 3.24) Recovered share -0.001 (-0.66) 0.000 ( 0.42)
Recovery time 0.000 ( 2.45) Recovery time -0.001 (-0.75) 0.002 ( 3.29)
Number of observations 22,620 1,287 1,287
Period of time 1989-1995-1998 1989-1995-1998 1989-1995-1998
Predicted probability 0.043 0.099 0.083
Pseudo R squared 0.06864
Table 12
TOBIT ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS
OF THE LOAN’S SIZE (1)





Age 0.591 ( 7.77) 0.668 ( 5.05)
Age squared -8.690 (-10.5) -9.598 (-6.83)
Log Income 8.758 ( 5.06) 5.830 ( 2.22)
Log Income squared -0.999 (-4.21) -0.644 (-1.80)
Log  Net wealth 1.406 ( 6.03) 0.161 ( 0.50)
Log Net wealth squared -0.048 (-1.57) 0.071 ( 1.66)
Retirement income 1.445 ( 4.85) 1.053 ( 2.42)
Self-employed -1.300 (-4.77) -1.265 (-2.78)
No. of income earners 0.872 ( 5.68) 0.964 ( 4.14)
Married 2.411 ( 8.22) 3.001 ( 5.81)
No. of children 0.360 ( 2.79) 0.079 ( 0.38)
High risk in financial
Investment
0.870 ( 2.28) 0.385 ( 0.75)
High school education 0.788 ( 3.43) 0.913 ( 2.35)
Mun. <20,000 inhab -1.814 (-7.15) -1.595 (-3.56)
Centre 1.310 ( 3.90) 2.743 ( 4.51)
South 0.006 ( 0.01) 0.495 ( 0.66)
Herfindahl index 5.179 ( 3.05) 7.603 ( 2.63)
Loan interest rate -0.015 (-0.10) -0.314 (-1.37)
Recovered share 0.054 ( 3.88) 0.066 ( 2.69)
Recovery time 0.001 (  0.06) -0.029 (-1.36)
Constant -60.310  (-13.6) -45.846  (-6.57)
N. of observations 31,588 13,340
N. of uncensored observations 6.460 3,071
N. of censored observations 25,128 10,269
Period 1989-1998 1989-1998
Prob Likelihood ratio/Wald test all
the coefficients =0
0.000 0.000




(1) The dependent variable is the logarithm of  the households’ debt.65
Table 13
TWO-STAGE HECKMAN ESTIMATION
OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LOAN’S SIZE (1)









Age -0.013 (-6.34) -0.012 (-2.49) -0.016 (-5.28) -0.012 (-1.75)
Log Income -0.095 (-1.96) -0.249 (-2.93) -0.188 (-2.54) -0.321 (-2.51)
Log  Net wealth 0.295 ( 24.5) 0.260 ( 9.25) 0.290 ( 22.7) 0.256 ( 8.74)
Retirement income 0.161 ( 3.30) 0.052 ( 0.56) 0.125 ( 2.01) 0.012 (0.11)
Self-employed 0.127 ( 2.95) 0.253 ( 2.66) 0.237 ( 3.52) 0.322 (2.43)
No. of income earners 0.084 ( 3.38) 0.143 ( 2.93) 0.133 ( 4.10) 0.161 (2.54)
Married 0.084 ( 1.56) -0.016 (-0.13) 0.044 ( 0.68) -0.059 (-0.43)
No. of children -0.001 (-0.04) 0.056 ( 1.37) 0.048 ( 1.67) 0.072 (1.30)
High school education 0.163 ( 4.39) 0.200 ( 2.66) 0.119 ( 2.72) 0.170 (2.00)
High risk in financial
investment
-0.005 (-0.08) 0.054 ( 0.55) -0.054 (-0.82) 0.017( 0.15)
Centre -0.066 (-1.19) -0.122 (-1.00) -0.011 (-0.18) -0.106 (-0.79)
South -0.151 (-2.02) -0.059 (-0.37) 0.031 (-0.34) 0.004 ( 0.02)
Herfindahl index -0.114 (-0.41) 0.102 ( 0.17) -0.311 (-1.05) -0.035 (-0.05)
Loan interest rate -0.066 (-2.66) -0.072 (-1.56) -0.052 (-2.03) -0.067 (-1.43)
Recovered share 0.009 ( 3.75) 0.014 ( 2.61) 0.008 ( 3.12) 0.013 ( 2.33)
Recovered time 0.001 ( 0.46) 0.002 ( 0.53) 0.001 ( 0.33) 0.002 ( 0.48)
Constant 2.104 ( 4.63) 2.607 ( 2.84) 2.529 ( 3.57) 3.238 ( 2.37)
Non random sample
correction for D=1
0.043 ( 0.22) -0.149 (-0.38)
Non random sample
correction for NLC=1
-4.389 (-2.36) -2.195 (-0.65)
N. of observations 6,334 1,949 6,334 1,949
Period 1989-1998 1989-1998 1989-1998 1989-1998
R squared 0.129 0.129










effects estimations  are
not systematic
0.048 0.095
(1) The dependent variable is the logarithm of the households’ debt. The number of observations is lower
compared with the number of uncensored observations in Table 12 because in this specification we exclude
from the sample not only households with zero debt, but also households that have been rationed at least once
in the period under investigation. In the two-stage Heckman estimation the standard errors are not corrected.66
Table 14
ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LOAN’S SIZE FOR TWO
SUBPERIODS







Age -0.015 (-3.13) 0.010 (-2.56)
Log Income -0.187 (-2.11) -0.179 (-1.43)
Log  Net wealth 0.273 (15.6) 0.319 (16.6)
Retirement income 0.010 (0.13) 0.252 (2.65)
Self-employed 0.139 (1.69) 0.280 (2.57)
No. of income earners 0.092 (2.01) 0.125 (2.80)
Married 0.083 (1.05) -0.037 (-0.33)
No. of children 0.019 (0.47) 0.022 (0.54)
High school education 0.181 (3.41) 0.061 (0.87)
High risk in financial
investment
0.038 (0.40) -0.109 (-1.21)
Centre -0.041 (-0.48) -0.058 (-0.65)
South -0.022 (-0.18) -0.189 (-1.42)
Herfindahl index -0.425 (-1.10) -0.196 (-0.40)
Loan interest rate -0.095 (-2.56) -0.021 (-0.57)
Recovered share 0.004  (1.26) 0.014 ( 3.55)
Recovery time 0.001 (0.38) 0.001 ( 0.24)
Non random sample
correction for D=1
-0.132 (-0.48) -0.069 (-0.26)
Non random sample
correction for NLC=1
-1.401 (-0.65) -4.408 (-1.36)
Constant 3.760 (4.11) 1.004 (1.11)
N. of observations 3,429 2.905
Period 1989-1993 1995-98
R squared 0.127 0.13867
Figure 1
PROBABILITY OF DEBT AND AGE
Figures 1 to 3 report the effect on the probability of debt based on the coefficients of the panel regression in
Table 7; Figure 4 hinges on the coefficients of the credit rationing pooled regression without dummy area
reported in Table 11. Probabilities are estimated at the mean values of the independent variables different from








PROBABILITY OF DEBT AND INCOME
(income is expressed at 1995 prices and in thousands of euros)










































































































PROBABILITY OF DEBT AND RECOVERED SHARE OF THE LOAN
(recovered share is in percentage)
Figure 4
PROBABILITY OF RATIONING AND RECOVERY TIME
(recovery time is in months)
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